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TARGETING EXEMPTION FOR
CHARITABLE EFFICIENCY: DESIGNING A
NONDIVERSION CONSTRAINT
Frances R. Hill*

EXEMPTION

I.

INTRODUCTION

from taxation has become a policy without a rationale and a tax regime without conceptual coherence at the very
time that exempt organizations are being used for everything
from operating business enterprises to financing political campaigns. The
malleability of the exempt organization form means that it is commonly
co-opted for commercial and political purposes.1 This convergence of activities erodes the distinctiveness of exempt organizations. 2 It is no
longer possible to refer to exempt organizations with any confidence that
a taxable entity or a political organization is not engaged in the same
kinds of activities. 3 In this era of convergence between the taxable and
* Professor of Law and Director of the Graduate Program in Taxation, University of
Miami School of Law; J.D. from the Yale Law School and Ph.D. in Government from
Harvard University; co-author, with Douglas M. Mancino, of TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (2002). The author wishes to thank participants in faculty seminars at the

University of Iowa College of Law and the University of Pennsylvania Law School for
their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article and to thank the University of
Miami School of Law for a summer research grant that supported work on this article.
1. Since September 11, 2001, the use of the charitable form as a device for financing
terrorist activities has been featured in press reports on efforts to trace the flow of terrorist
funds around the world. Some organizations appear to be engaged simultaneously in charitable activities and terrorism or the funding of terrorism. U.S. Representative Michael
Oxley (R-OH) Holds Hearing on Disputing Terrorist Network Case Flow: Hearing Before
the House FinancialServs. Comm., 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Rep. Oxley, Chairman, House Financial Servs. Comm.).
2. Pioneering work on convergence marks the three books written by Burton A.
Weisbrod and his collaborators in which convergence issues have become an increasingly
prominent theme. See BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT SECTOR: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1978); BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY (1988);
BURTON A. WEISBROD,

To PROFIT

OR NOT To PROFIT: THE COMMERCIAL TRANSFORMA-

TION OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR (1998).

3. The cases of commercial convergence and campaign convergence differ in one important respect even though both may divert resources from exempt activities. Commercial activities raise questions of internal diversion but seem to have no adverse impact on
markets. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Unfair Competition and Corporate Income Taxation, 34
STAN. L. REV. 1017 (1982). The efforts to show that exempt organizations were subsidized
producers that lowered prices in markets have been inconclusive. For a recent article summarizing and rejecting these efforts, see John D. Colombo, A Proposalfor an Exit Tax on
Nonprofit Conversion Transactions, 23 J. CORP. L. 779 (1998). Political activities differ
because they provide an avenue around the reporting and disclosure provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (2002) ("FECA"). For a discussion of
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exempt sectors and between political organizations and charities, what
does it mean to describe an organization as exempt?
Current tax law provides no satisfactory answer to this question. Indeed, the question itself is rarely asked. Most efforts to develop a rationale for exemption are simply rationalizations of the current tax rules.
The rules are isolated requirements that are easily manipulated to encompass activities related tenuously, at best, to the statutory purposes that
purportedly provide the rationales for exemption.
Current tax law provides exemption from taxation for a broad range of
organizations. 4 By any available measure, tax exempt nonprofit organizations are growing rapidly.5 The number of exempt organizations and
the revenues they control continue to increase. 6 Such increases are espe7
cially marked with respect to § 501(c)(3) charitable organizations.
Americans continue to support exempt organizations with their financial
contributions and with the donation of their time and talents. 8
these issues, see Frances R. Hill, Softer Money: Exempt Organizations and Campaign Finance, 91 TAX NOTES 477 (2001) and 32 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 27 (2001).

4. Section 501(c) enumerates the types of organizations that may qualify for exemption under § 501(a). In addition, § 529 (qualified tuition payments) and § 527 (political
organizations) are exempt from taxation. All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the "code"). For analysis of the various types of exempt
organizations, see FRANCES R. HILL & DOUGLAS M. MANCINo, TAXATION OF EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS (2002) [hereinafter TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS].
5. One of the more intensive efforts to document the growth of the exempt sectors is
available in J. COMM. ON TAX'N, 106TH CONGRESS, STUDY OF PRESENT LAW TAXPAYER
CONFIDENTIALITY AND DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 3802 OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998, VOLUME I:
STUDY OF DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS RELATING TO TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, JCS-100 (Comm. Print 2000) [hereinafter JCT DISCLOSURE STUDY]. The JCT based its compu-

tations on data from the IRS Exempt Organizations/Business Master File, Table 3. Id. at
18 n.31. The JCT included the following helpful caveat with respect to this data source:
The data regarding tax-exempt organizations provided in this section and
elsewhere in this volume of the study were assembled by the IRS for a variety of purposes. Different data were subject to different level of quality review by the IRS; consequently, the accuracy of the numbers provided may
vary. Unless otherwise noted, the data provided includes only those organizations that have received recognition of their tax-exempt status from the
IRS. Thus, the data does not include organizations, such as churches, that
are not required to seek recognition of tax-exempt status from the IRS.
Id.

6. According to one recent estimate, exempt organizations account for twelve percent of gross domestic product. Cecelia Hilgert, Charities and Other Tax-Exempt Organizations, 1994, 17 STAT. OF INCOME BULL. 89 (1998) [hereinafter SOI BULLETIN].
7. JCT DISCLOSURE STUDY, supra note 5, at 18, 20 finds that there are over 776,000
such organizations.

8. It was not surprising that Americans turned to § 501(c)(3) organizations when they
wanted to assist families of the victims of the September 11 attacks. The ensuing controversies over organizations' use of these contributions has raised long-neglected questions
relating to the role of contributors and beneficiaries and the appropriate discretion afforded to organization managers. These controversies were the subject of two Congressional hearings in late 2001. Charitable Contributionsfor September 11: ProtectionAgainst

Fraud,Waste, and Abuse: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. (2001); Charitable Organizations
Response to Terrorist Attacks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. (2001).
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This article asks whether increases in the number and revenue of
§ 501(c)(3) organizations mean that charitable activity has increased or
has increased to a commensurate extent. The only response is that no
one can say with any certainty. The reasons that this fundamental question cannot be answered are found not simply in data insufficiency but
also, and more importantly, in conceptual insufficiency. The exempt sector is incompletely described and only partially theorized. 9 This article
explores the proposition that a significant proportion of the growth in the
exempt sector has been growth in non-exempt activities, and that much of
the growth reflects diversion of resources from exempt activities to commercial or political activities. Convergence of activities and the malleability of the exempt organization form are features of the contemporary
economy.10

The issue is not whether particular activities should be limited to particular forms. This is neither possible nor desirable. There is no reason to
seek to prohibit taxable universities or exempt universities or to require
that all health care be provided by nonprofit tax-exempt hospitals or by
taxable hospitals. There is no reason to ban gift shops or restaurants in
museums or T-shirt sales at zoos. Efforts to halt convergence by restrictive clauses in the organization's articles are unlikely to prevail and are
inconsistent with the modern trend in corporate law against the ultra
vires doctrine.II
The question explored here is not what activities an exempt organization should be permitted to undertake, but how various activities should
be taxed. The tax issue posed by convergence is not whether the activities themselves are ultra vires, but whether they are consistent with the
tax efficiency of the exemption provisions. Are the benefits provided by
exemption from taxation and the deduction of charitable contributions
efficient in the sense that they are targeted to exempt activity? Or, are
these tax provisions inefficient in the sense that they subsidize all of the
activities in which exempt organizations now engage? To the extent that
exemption is a benefit for the conduct of activities that are consistent
with § 501(c)(3) purposes, the exemption provisions are efficient. To the
extent that exemption subsidizes activities that are not related to exempt
purposes, they are tax inefficient. This article proposes a tax mechanism
9. These two propositions are closely related. Incomplete empirical data undermines
theoretical development, and partial theories limit the data analyses that can be conducted
even with present data.
10. Convergence in operations activities may well result in institutional isomorphism
in terms of organizational structures and operations. See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W.
Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in

Organizational Fields, in

THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS

(Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991). For an insightful discussion of the role
of such philanthropists as Margaret Slocum Sage, Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller,
and Henry Ford in structuring the large private foundations along the line of a business
enterprise, see Peter Dobkin Hall, A HistoricalOverview of the Private Nonprofit Sector, in
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR:

A

RESEARCH HANDBOOK 3-26

(Walter W. Powell ed., 1987).

11. See, e.g., Michael A. Schaeftler, Ultra Vires-Ultra Useless: The Myth of State Interest in Ultra Vires Acts of Business Corporations,9 J. CORP. L. 81 (1983).
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for targeting exemption to exempt activities and preventing diversion of
the benefits of tax exemption to activities that are not related to exempt
purposes.
This article focuses on the question of whether the diversification of the
activities to exempt organizations to encompass commercial and political
activities is consistent with charitable efficiency. Exemption from taxation is the operative question. There is no barrier in tax law to conducting charitable activity with after-tax money. An individual who does
not want a charitable contribution deduction is free to give away money,
wisely or foolishly, as that person determines. A corporation may do the
same thing, limited only by its duty to its shareholders. Both patterns of
activity are tax inefficient.
The § 170 charitable contribution deduction and the § 501(c)(3) exemption are together a means of solving the tax inefficiency of using after-tax money for charity. This structure is efficient to the extent that it is
targeted to the kind of activities that are consistent with achieving the
organization's exempt purposes. However, to the extent that it would be
possible to operate a department store or a manufacturing plant by capitalizing the enterprise with deductible contributions and paying no tax on
the income, legitimate questions arise.' 2 The same is true to the extent
that one can offer political contributors a tax deduction for a political
contribution.' 3 The question explored here is a question of charitable
efficiency and the internal diversion of resources to activities that neither
support exemption from taxation nor bear any meaningful relation to an
organization's articulated exempt purpose. The lack of targeting of exemption to activities consistent with exempt purposes undermines the
charitable efficiency of exemption and the § 170 deduction.
The absence of appropriate targeting of exemption for charitable efficiency arises in substantial part from the unarticulated "organizational
presumption" that pervades current law and its interpretation. Activities
conducted by exempt organizations are generally presumed to be consistent with the organization's exempt status. This reasoning becomes increasingly circular over time. An organization is initially treated as
exempt on the basis of one or more exempt purposes stated in its organiz12. There is little doubt that any of these activities could be conducted on a tax-exempt basis by a university through the simple expedient of integrating them into the curriculum, thereby satisfying the substantially related exception to the definition of an
unrelated trade or business. See I.R.C. § 513(a) (2002); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d) (2002).
For a detailed analysis of the substantially related requirement, see TAXATION OF EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 4, T 22.05.
13. The use of § 501(c)(3) organizations to offer political contributors a tax deduction
may well become more common now that the Federal Election Commission ("FEC") has
promulgated final regulations that exempt § 501(c)(3) organizations from the "electioneering communication" requirements of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
("BCRA"), Pub. L. No. 155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002). See 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(c)(6). By basing
this position solely on the prohibition on participation or intervention in a political campaign that applies to § 501(c)(3) organizations, the FEC avoided an inquiry into whether
issue ads consistent with § 501(c)(3) status might constitute electioneering communication
within the meaning of the BCRA.
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ing documents. 14 Because the determination is made at the beginning of
an organization's existence, before it has developed the full range of activities that it will pursue, the initial exempt purpose may become unrelated to its activities. While a § 501(c)(3) organization is required to be
both organized and operated for an exempt purpose, the operational test
is less rigorous than the organizational test in the sense that the initial
grant of recognition of exemption shapes the perception of the organization's activities. 15 In practice, the definition of exempt activities becomes
the activities conducted by an exempt organization. The result is charitable inefficiency. As exempt entities engage in more and more activities
that are indistinguishable from those of taxable entities and political committees, defining activities as exempt based on the exempt status of the
organization is incoherent and inefficient. The organizational presumption is the basis of this charitable inefficiency.
The organizational presumption is also the basis for the lack of transparency and the absence of accountability that is characteristic of so
many exempt organizations. Exempt organizations have resisted disclosing information relating to most of their operations and the sources of
their funds. 16 In effect, the organizational presumption results in information asymmetry between organization insiders and anyone else, includ17
ing contributors, beneficiaries, the public, and government regulators.
The absence of monitoring and the lack of governance mechanisms that
would achieve monitoring from within the organization mean that organization managers can diversify the organization's activities under the cover
of the organizational presumption while still claiming to be operating an
exempt organization. The managers may well be technically correct
under current law, no matter how diverse the organization's activities
become.
Exempt organizations that engage in these activities do not take the
position that they are operating commercial or political enterprises as
ends in themselves. Rather, they assert that the commercial or political
activities are inextricably related to their exempt activities or that such
activities, particularly commercial activities, provide revenue used to fund
exempt activities. The first assertion, that activities are related to exempt
purposes, is simply a matter of advocacy. One example is college football. If the Service had not issued a series of revenue rulings providing
that both intramural and intercollegiate athletics were exempt activities,
universities would simply have begun offering a degree in athletic
14. The organizational test is set forth in Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b) (2002).
15. The operational test is set forth in Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c) (2002).
16. For a discussion of the disclosure requirements, see infra Part II.A. at notes 39-42.

For a detailed discussion of these requirements, see

TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZA-

supra note 4, 33.05.
17. For an economic analysis of the market distortions introduced by information
asymmetry, see George A. Akerlof, The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcoN. 488 (1970) (analyzing the effects of information asymTIONS,

metry in used car market).
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activities. 8
The second assertion, that exempt organizations use revenue from all
sources for their exempt activities, raises empirical and conceptual questions. Virtually no data exist on how exempt organizations use their resources. The conceptual issue is why an exempt organization should be
able to operate a pasta factory, a profitable football program, or an oligopolistic blood bank on a tax-favored basis even if it uses the revenue for
charitable activity. Asking this question focuses on the nexus between
sources and uses of revenue. This article considers the nexus between
sources and uses not as a matter of the unrelated business income tax but
as a question of the reasons for exemption.1 9
The leading rationale for tax exemption is Henry Hansmann's effort to
address contract failure arising from information asymmetry.2 0 The information asymmetry Hansmann addresses arises in the case of a "purchaser" who wants to provide a benefit to a third party, which is the
paradigmatic case of a charitable contribution. The problem of information asymmetry for Hansmann is that the purchaser cannot be certain
that the money committed to the organization will be used as he or she
intends, because the purchaser lacks access to information needed to
monitor the organization's use of the money. Instead of providing the
purchaser additional information about the uses of the money or a role in
the governance of the organization as a way of imposing accountability,
Hansmann's response is to offer the purchaser more information about
the organization itself. The information that Hansmann proposes to provide is the information that the organization will not use the purchaser's
money for the benefit of the organization's insiders. Hansmann calls this
information the "nondistribution constraint." In tax law, this kind of in18. Rev. Rul. 67-291, 1967-2 C.B. 184 and Rev. Rul. 64-275, 1964-2 C.B. 142 treat
activities related to intercollegiate athletics as tax exempt. Rev. Rul. 80-295, 1980-2 C.B.
194 and Rev. Rul. 80-296, 1980-2 C.B. 195 treat the sale of broadcast rights to amateur
athletic contests and intercollegiate games as education of the public, an exempt activity.
19. In effect, this article brings the destination of income doctrine of prior law back
into active consideration, but for the purpose of determining what is going on inside a
purportedly exempt organization, not for the purpose of determining whether an activity
produces unrelated business income. The destination of income doctrine is based on Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores,263 U.S. 578 (1924) (holding that revenue from the
sale of wine and chocolate was not taxable because the revenue was used for the religious
order's exempt religious activities). For a discussion of the destination of income doctrine
for determining unrelated business income tax issues, see TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 4, $ 21.0l[1].

20. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980);
Henry B. Hansmann, The Rationalefor Exempting Nonprofit Organizationsfrom the Corporate Income Tax, 91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981); Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit
Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1981); The Effect of Tax Exemption and Other
Factors on the Market Share of Nonprofit versus For-Profit Firms, 40 NAT'L TAX J. 71
(1987) [hereinafter The Effect of Tax Exemption on Market Share]; Henry B. Hansmann,
The Evolving Law of Nonprofit Organizations:Do Current Trends Make Good Policy?, 39
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 807 (1989) [hereinafter The Evolving Law of Nonprofit Organizations]; Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 75
VA. L. REV. 605 (1989).
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formation is provided by the private benefit doctrines. 21
This article suggests that diversion of resources from exempt to nonexempt activities inside exempt organizations is an equally important issue
and proposes enactment of a "nondiversion constraint" applicable to particular activities funded by particular sources of revenue. This article
contrasts the concept of an organization as an entity with the concept of
an organization as an aggregate. It suggests that entity treatment has adverse consequences for the efficiency of exemption and the § 170 deduction because the benefits of these two provisions are not targeted to
exempt activities. This article identifies characterization issues that are
made more difficult by the organizational presumption arising from the
entity approach and discusses the difficulties of determining under what
circumstances an entity should be exempt based on a limited amount of
exempt activity. This article suggests that viewing an organization as an
aggregate of transactions enhances charitable efficiency by targeting tax
benefits to exempt activities. This article analyzes organizations as aggregates of transactions through which revenue from particular sources is
allocated to particular uses. It then maps patterns of either charitable
activity or patterns of diversion arising through matching sources of revenue to particular uses inside organizations. Based on this map of diversion, which is a map of specific patterns of charitable inefficiency, this
article sets forth a legislative proposal for targeting exemption through a
nondiversion constraint based on transfer taxes on diversion transactions
within the organization. This nondiversion constraint is seen as operating
in conjunction with, not replacing, Hansmann's nondistribution
constraint.
II.

EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AS ORGANIZATIONS

Exempt organizations are only partially described and incompletely
theorized largely because analysis has focused on the adjective and ignored the noun. 22 Focusing on exemption without also focusing on what
it means to be an organization can never be more than partially successful
as an approach to analyzing exempt organizations. Focusing on the adjective while ignoring the noun has come to mean that a peppercorn of exempt activity is treated as the defining characteristic of an entire
organization. This approach results in reliance on an unarticulated organizational presumption that all activities of an exempt organization are
exempt activities (or at least closely related to exempt activities) because
the organization conducting the activities is an exempt organization. The
21. Hansmann located his nondistribution constraint primarily in state nonprofit corporation law and devoted relatively little attention to tax law. See supra note 20.
22. Partial descriptions and incomplete theories reinforce each other. Now that more
data are becoming more readily available through Guidestar (http://www.guidestar.com)
and the National Center on Nonprofits & Philanthropy and the National Center for Charitable Statistics at the Urban Institute (http://www.nccs.urban.org), issues of partial theories
are becoming more important. Data do not explain themselves, and theories are required,
if only to be rejected or refined.
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label initially affixed to the organization becomes an independent factor
in characterizing the organization's activities. As a result, activities which
would be taxable or would be subject to regulation under federal election
law if conducted outside of a § 501(c) organization become exempt activities or are treated as substantially related to exempt purposes.2 3 The organizational presumption thus facilitates convergence between the
taxable sector and the exempt sector and increases the difficulty of articulating reasons for the favorable tax treatment accorded § 501(c)
organizations.
This section of the article examines two approaches to the analysis of
exempt organizations as organizations-the entity approach and the aggregate approach. It suggests that treating organizations as entities obscures analysis of the internal structures and operations of organizations
and thereby facilitates diversion of funds from exempt to nonexempt uses
within the organization. The entity approach creates three fundamental
problems: It equates an organization with its managers, it exacerbates the
information asymmetry that precludes meaningful transparency and accountability, and it facilitates diversion of revenue from exempt to nonexempt activities.
This section then suggests that an aggregate approach that treats an
organization as a nexus of transactions through which revenue from particular sources is allocated to particular uses offers a more heuristic conceptual framework for addressing these issues. The aggregate approach
directs attention to the multiple sources of funds, the multiple activities
conducted by exempt organizations, and the possibility of diversion of
funds from exempt to nonexempt uses. In light of the patterns of diversion that this approach suggests, the central analytical question becomes
the descriptive and analytical utility of treating organizations as entities.
It also leads to questions about the decision-making processes that result
in diversion and the informational predicate required for monitoring and
accountability. These questions suggest that an exempt organization is
more than its managers, but encompasses contributors and beneficiaries
as well.2 4 Thus, the aggregate approach raises fundamental questions
about the organizational presumption arising from the entity approach.
A.

ORGANIZATIONS AS ENTITIES

For federal income tax purposes, exempt organizations are generally
treated as entities. Section 501(a) refers to organizations' being treated
as exempt. While § 501(c)(3) enumerates exempt purposes and then refers to several activities that are either limited or prohibited, there is no
meaningful concept of what proportion of an exempt organization's revenue or staff time or any other factor must be devoted to exempt activities
in order to sustain exemption for the organization. 25
23. See infra Part III.A.
24. This article does not address the role of the public as stakeholders.
25. See infra Part III.B. for a discussion of the commensurate in scope concept.
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Exemption for § 501(c)(3) organizations now' rests largely on compliance with the three private benefit doctrines: private benefit, 26 inurement,2 7 and excess benefit transactions. 28 These three doctrines are the
29
expression in the tax law of Hansmann's nondistribution constraint.
Much of the past two decades of policy effort in the exempt organization
field has been devoted to developing the three private benefit doctrines,
but much remains to be done. The limitations and prohibitions on various forms of private benefit are important for charitable efficiency in
30
their own right.
At the same time, using the private benefit doctrines as the touchstone
for exempt status has had the paradoxical and counterintuitive result of
reinforcing the organizational presumption arising from treating exempt
organizations as entities. Misuse of the private benefit doctrines in this
way conflates the absence of a private benefit with the presence of a public benefit. While the regulations provide that "[aln organization is not
operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes if its net earnings
inure in whole or part to the benefit of private shareholders or interests," 31 they also provide that "[a]n organization is not organized or operated for one or more [exempt] purposes . . . unless it serves a public

rather than a private interest. '32 Each of these requirements must be
satisfied. The absence of a private benefit does not in itself establish the
presence of a public benefit. A hospital may pay appropriate compensation based on comparable compensation arrangements in that area but
still not provide a community benefit and thus would not qualify for exemption as an organization described in § 501(c)(3). An organization established to study the effect of acid rain on coniferous trees may pay
modest salaries and engage in no other private benefit activity but still
either do no studies or never release any of its studies to the public. In
these cases, there is an absence of private benefit and an absence of public benefit. The error of current law is to conflate the absence of a private
benefit with the presence of a public benefit.
The private benefit doctrines are concerned to varying degrees with
conflicts of interest involving organization managers. Provided that organization managers do not violate these conflict of interest prescriptions
of varying degrees of specificity, the organization will remain exempt. Indeed, the innovative element of § 4958 is to insulate the organization
26. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2002); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (2002).
27. Section 501(c)(3) is a private benefit to insiders who have substantial influence
over the operation of the organization. Any amount of inurement in theory supports revocation of exemption, but the Service has been reluctant to take this step. In the case of
dormant organizations or organizations with no remaining resources, revocation of exemption imposes no meaningful sanction.
28. Section 4958 imposes sanctions on organization managers and disqualified persons,
but not on the exempt organization, in the case of excess benefit transaction.
29. See supra note 20.
30. For a detailed discussion of the three private benefit doctrines, see TAXATION OF
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 4, at ch. 4.
31. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (1959).
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(1)(ii) (1959).
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from any consequences whatsoever in the event of an excess benefit
transaction. In effect, exemption now depends on a formulation of the
private benefit doctrines that imposes no sanctions at all on the organization.33 Thus, it is now in practice virtually impossible for an organization
to lose its exempt status.3 4 This may well be a rational approach to private benefit. What is not rational is to use the private benefit doctrines as
the primary or even sole criterion of exemption.
The paradox of the private benefit doctrines' misuse as the primary
criteria of exempt status is that it exacerbates information asymmetry,
and thereby limits the opportunity for meaningful accountability of organization managers. As long as organization managers avoid private
benefit issues, they are able to use the private benefit doctrines as an
important reason for limiting the role of contributors and beneficiaries in
organizational governance. Section 501(c)(3) organizations are distinctively opaque. Few have members with the right to elect directors or to
participate in organizational governance. 3 5
The governance structures of most § 501(c)(3) organizations would be
familiar to Berle and Means. 36 In fact, the centralization of managerial
control is even more complete in the absence of shareholders with the
dual rights of owners-the right to receive distributions and the right to
participate in corporate governance. 37 Reliance on the nondistribution
constraint to prevent distributions unrelated to the organization's exempt
purposes has been misused as a rationale for limiting the right of contributors or beneficiaries to participate in governance of exempt organizations. This position is based on the erroneous assertion that such
involvement by contributors or beneficiaries would mean that distributions to beneficiaries would become private benefits that would jeopardize the organization's exempt status.
33. The excess benefit transaction provision of I.R.C. § 4958 is likely to displace both

the inurement and the private benefit provisions of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) because it is more
fully articulated, thereby providing greater guidance to both audit agents and exempt
organizations.
34. Revocation has always been highly unlikely due to the reluctance of the Service to
take such a step, but there has not previously been a statutory provision that provides
protection from revocation.
35. I.R.C. § 501(c)(5) labor organizations and § 501(c)(6) business leagues, as well as
social and fraternal organizations, have members with some role in the election of directors
and in organizational governance.
36. ADOLPH BERLE, JR. & GARDNER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933) (discussing separation of ownership and control in business
corporations). For an analysis of the process of consolidating hierarchical control in participatory structures like political parties, see ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A
SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY

OF THE OLIGARCHIAL TENDENCIES

OF MODERN

DEMOCRACY

(Eden & Cedar Paul trans., 1968) (1915).
37. This article does not deal primarily with these governance issues, but instead suggests that governance issues of participation and accountability are related to the information asymmetry that arises from treating an organization as an unexamined entity rather
than as an aggregate of activities. The proposal developed in this article for a nondiversion
constraint gives the concept of transparency operational meaning. In so doing, it provides
a basis for increased accountability through participation by directors, members, contributors, and even beneficiaries and the public.
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Transparency is much discussed in the wake of the controversies over
the use of funds by the September 11 charities and the scandals in the
corporate world relating to the use of off-balance sheet special purpose
entities. 38 Exempt organizations, like taxable entities, are already subject
to disclosure requirements. 39 The application for recognition of exemption, the organization's articles, and the annual information return for the
past three years are all subject to disclosure. 40 The names of contributors
are not currently subject to disclosure to the public, although the five
largest contributors are disclosed to the Service. The UBIT return is not
disclosable because it is a tax return that is subject to the confidentiality
provision of the Code. 4 1 The kind of information that defines the
nondiversion constraint is not disclosed because it does not exist in any
form that can be conveyed to the public. Current discussions relating to
changes in the annual information return do not contemplate the kind of
42
information that defines the nondiversion constraint.
Disclosure provides the basis for but is distinguishable from accountability. Mere disclosure of raw data does not necessarily assist those persons who cannot analyze the data in terms meaningful to their concerns.
Indeed, some forms of disclosure may enhance organizational opacity.
Even forms of disclosure that permit directors, members and others to
use the data do not in themselves provide for accountability in the absence of governance structures that give directors and members a voice in
the organization's operations.
B.

ORGANIZATIONS AS AGGREGATES

An exempt organization is not devoted solely to exempt activities. Organizations, including exempt organizations, are aggregates of multiple
activities. A § 501(c)(3) organization is an aggregate of exempt activities
and other activities that are either inconsistent with exempt status or permissible only in some limited amount. Convergence of the activities of
exempt organizations with the activities of taxable entities or political organizations means that exempt organizations, including § 501(c)(3) organizations, tend to engage in a broad range of activities.
Exempt organization theorists have attempted to deal with this issue by
developing typologies of organizations. 43 The most common such type is
38. Charitable Contributionsfor September 11: Protecting Against Fraud, Waste, and

Abuse: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigationsof the House Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. (2001); CharitableOrganizationsResponse to Terrorist Attacks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. (2001).
39. For a detailed discussion of disclosure requirements, see TAXATION OF EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 4, at ch. 33. See also JCT DISCLOSURE STUDY, supra note 5.
40. I.R.C. § 6104(d) (2002).
41. I.R.C. § 6104(d)(3) (2002); Treas. Reg. § 301.6104(d)-l(b)(3)(iii) (1999).
42. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAx-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: IMPROVEMENTS
POSSIBLE IN PUBLIC, IRS, AND STATE OVERSIGHT OF CHARITIES, GAO-02-526 (2002).
43. Mark A. Hall & John D. Columbo, The Donative Theory of the CharitableExemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379 (1991); Mark A. Hall & John D. Columbo, The Charitable
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the concept of a "commercial nonprofit" which refers to exempt organizations that earn program service revenue from engaging in an exempt
activity, and not to organizations that earn returns on their investments
or engage in profitable business activities. The paradigmatic commercial
nonprofit under this approach is a hospital. 44 These typologies, however
constructed, tend to exacerbate the analytical problems in the entity approach in so far as they use the presence or absence of one element to
characterize an entire organization. To the extent that such typologies
bespeak recognition of the multiple activities in which exempt organizations engage, they might be considered useful modifications of the entity
construct. Conceptualizing an exempt organization as an aggregate of activities, only some of which support exemption, presents a more analytically useful and empirically descriptive view than do prior efforts to
45
develop typologies of exempt organizations.
Tax law identifies at least three types of activities, each with a different
relation to exempt status. First are the activities that provide the basis for
exemption. Section 501(c)(3) lists'eight exempt purposes: religious, charitable, scientific, literary, educational, fostering national or international
amateur sports competition, preventing cruelty to children and animals,
and testing for public safety. 46 Second are activities that do not themselves support exemption, but are consistent with exempt status provided
that the extent of the activities is limited. Examples are legislative lobbying for § 501(c)(3) organizations, 47 an insubstantial amount of private
benefit transactions, a broad range of commercial activities that have
been excepted from the unrelated business income tax, 48 and an undetermined amount of unrelated business income. These activities jeopardize
Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L.
REV. 307 (1991); Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REv. 501,
520-62 (1990).
44. Academics who write on exemption appear reluctant to treat universities as commercial nonprofits. For a notable exception, see John D. Columbo, Why Is Harvard TaxExempt? (And Other Mysteries of Tax Exemption for Private Educational Institutions), 35
ARiz. L. REV. 841, 843 (1993).
45. This approach is based on theories of the firm as a nexus of contracts. See R.H.
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). For a contemporary perspective
on the implications of Coase, see Jason Scott Johnson, The Influence of The Nature of the
Firm on the Theory of Corporate Law, 18 J, CORP. L. 213 (1993). For an analysis of the
nexus of contracts theory in non-traditional markets, see Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Market
Efficiency and the Domain of the Firm, 18 J. CORP. L. 173 (1993).
46. The last purpose, testing for public safety, was added to § 501(c)(3) in 1954 to
reverse a judicial decision denying exempt status to Underwriters' Laboratories. See Underwriters' Labs. v. United States, 135 F. 2d 371, 374 (7th Cir. 1943). The legislative history
emphasizes the restriction of this provision to the testing of consumer products. See S.
REP. No. 1662-83 at 310 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 4950. This is the only
exempt purpose that supports exemption but does not support an I.R.C. § 170 charitable
contribution deduction.
47. Legislative lobbying is an exempt activity for I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) social welfare
organizations.
48. Investment activities, rents, royalties, dividends, interest, annuity payments, income from the leasing of mailing lists, trade show revenues, corporate sponsorship payments, and proceeds of bingo games are all exempt from the unrelated business income tax
under I.R.C. §§ 512(b), 513(d)-(i). For a detailed analysis of exceptions and modifications
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exempt status only if the extent of the activities exceeds certain limits. 4 9
Third are prohibited activities. Included in this third category are inurement 50 and, in the case of § 501(c)(3) organizations, participation or intervention in a political campaign. 51 In theory, any amount of the
prohibited activities supports revocation of exemption. In practice, such
substantial controversy surrounds characterization of particular activities
as either inurement, or participation or intervention in political campaigns that they rarely result in revocation of exemption.
The relative lack of inquiry .into the uses of resources is consistent with
a similar absence of analytical curiosity about exempt organizations'
sources of financial support. 52 Exempt organizations' capital structures
are only partially described and incompletely theorized. While the reasons for this neglect are unclear, part of the problem is a pervasive assumption that revenue from all sources is used for exempt activities.
Another part of this analytical lapse results from the assumption that the
sources of exempt organizations' resources are less important than the
uses of resources. This article suggests that analysis of exempt organizations begin with the assumptions that organizations have multiple sources
of financial support and that they use their resources for all of the activities in which they are known to engage. It is then possible to analyze the
implication of each source and each use and then map the patterns of
using revenues from particular sources for particular uses. In this way,
the assumptions and rationalizations that remain unexplored when one
conceptualizes exempt organizations as entities can be examined more
systematically.
Public charities are commonly assumed to derive their support from
contributions from the public.53 Voluntary contributions from the public
are consistent with the idea of exempt organizations as expressions of the
voluntary associative activity of individuals with common interests who
to the unrelated business income tax, see

TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, supra
note 4, at ch. 23.
49. The limitations are not precisely defined. Both the determination of the amount
of the activity and the specification of the limitation are not based on precedential guidance but are matters of facts and circumstances based as much on lore as on law.
50. Inurement is providing a private benefit to a person in a position to exert influence
over the operation of the organization.
51. These campaign activities are prohibited in the case of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations, but I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) organizations may engage in some amount of campaign
activities.
52. The data currently available come from the information returns, Form 990, filed by
exempt organizations with annual revenue of at least $25,000, and the annual return reporting unrelated business income, Form 990-T. Churches are not required to file annual
information returns without regard to their annual revenues, but they are required to file
returns reporting their unrelated business income. In addition to the data limitations arising from the filing requirements, data limitations arise from the design of the tax forms,
which are intended for tax administration and not primarily for research on exempt organizations. The forms' design results in underreporting of the amount of commercial activity
that falls in categories exempted from the unrelated business income tax.
53. The distinction between public charities and private foundations rests on the presence or absence of support from the public. See I.R.C. § 509 (2002) (defining public support for this purpose).
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are not dependent on government. In fact, direct contributions from the
public constitute approximately 10 percent of the support received by
public charities. 54 Because most public charities are not membership organizations, they collect very limited amounts of revenue in the form of
dues. Small organizations received approximately half of their support in
55
the form of direct contributions.
Contributions from corporate contributors are not separately stated in
government data but they are both important and controversial. 56 The
initial controversy arose with respect to the corporate contributors and
centered on whether contributions to exempt organizations were a breach
of the board's fiduciary duty to the shareholders as a waste of corporate
assets. This issue was addressed in the social responsibility movement
among corporations, which linked the profitability of the corporation
with the social betterment of the communities where the corporations
were located. Controversy also arose with respect to the effect of corporate contributions on the exempt organization recipient. The increasing
use of corporate sponsorship transactions has blurred the distinction between a contribution to the organization and the sale of advertising by
57
the exempt organization.
Grants from private foundations are not reported separately by the
Service, though the data would prove analytically useful in addressing issues of accountability and of the contributors role as actors in exempt
organizations. Grants from private foundations are negotiated by the
managers of public charities, and the private foundation managers may
become invested in the public charity managers. Private foundation support can thus reinforce managerial control.
54. S01

BULLETIN,

supra note 6, at 90, 92.

55. Id. at 91 (urging caution in relying on these data due to the small sample size).
56. There is a voluminous literature on this broad topic. The following references do
not claim completeness but do give a reasonable idea of the diverse approaches and viewpoints. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Conduct That Does Not Maximize Shareholder

Gain: Legal Conduct, Ethical Conduct, the Penumbra Effect, Reciprocity, the Prisoner's Dilemma, Sheep's Clothing, Social Conduct, and Disclosure, 28 STETSON L. REV. 1 (1998);
Faith S. Kahn, Pandora'sBox: ManagerialDiscretion and the Problem of CorporatePhilanthrophy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579 (1997); Henry N. Butler & Fred McChesney, Why They
Give at the Office: Shareholder Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the Corporation,84 CORNELL L. REV. 1195 (1999); Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradoxof
Corporate Giving: Tax Expenditures, the Nature of the Corporation,and the Social Construction of Charity, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1994).
57. The tax controversy issue involves only the exempt organization. The corporation
will properly deduct the amount either as an I.R.C. § 162(a) ordinary and necessary business expense or as an I.R.C. § 170 charitable contribution deduction. The exempt organization will not be subject to unrelated business income tax if the amount is a contribution
received through a corporate sponsorship transaction because the organization is treated
as merely acknowledging the generosity of the corporate sponsor but it will be taxed if the
amount is treated as revenue from the sale of advertising. The distinction between advertising and corporate sponsorship is elusive. For a history of the controversy over the Service's initial treatment of most corporate sponsorship transactions as sales of advertising by
an exempt organization, see Frances R. Hill, Corporate Sponsorship in Transactional Perspective: General Principles and Special Cases in the Law of Tax Exempt Organizations,13
U. MIAMI ENT. & SI'ORrs L. REV. 5 (1996).
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It is entirely possible for exempt organizations to operate almost entirely on funding from private foundations. Private foundations will require information on the use of the grants, but they are not in a position
to impose general accountability of the recipient organization to its contributors and beneficiaries. With private foundation support, a public
charity may serve a cause without becoming accountable to any constituency, body of contributors, or groups of beneficiaries. At the same time,
private foundations monitor their grant recipients, and this monitoring
focuses on both private benefit and diversion of grant funds to other uses.
The single largest source of revenue for the exempt sector in the aggregate was program service revenue, which accounted for over 70 percent
of exempt organizations' total revenue in 1994.58 Program service income is revenue from conducting activities that support exempt status,
59
such as tuition for providing education or fees for providing health care.
Universities and hospitals receive the bulk of these program service payments, but museums, nonprofit theaters, zoos, and community arts organizations charge admissions fees, and many types of educational
organizations, including those providing continuing legal education for
60
members of state bar associations, charge the equivalent of tuition.
Program service fees also include Medicare and Medicaid payments to
health care providers. Health care organizations accounted for 58 percent of the total revenue of the entire exempt sector, and 90 percent of
the revenues of health care organizations came from program services
payments. 6 1 Private tax-exempt educational institutions accounted for
over 25 percent of the total revenue of all exempt organizations, and pro62
gram service revenue accounted for 66 percent of this amount.
The analysis here refers to commercial activities, not to unrelated business income. Unrelated business income data are generally thought to
under report the extent of unrelated business income earned by exempt
organizations. In addition, these data do not report the amount of revenue earned from commercial activities that are not subject to the unrelated business income tax. Corporate sponsorship arrangements are one
of the most visible such arrangement. Affinity marketing arrangements-including credit cards, and income from the licensing of mailing
lists based on currently enrolled students and alumni-are lucrative
sources of revenue. More recently, some organizations have entered into
58. SO1 BULLETIN, supra note 6, at 90.
59. Education is one of the exempt purposes set forth in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), but health
care is not. Health care was initially an exempt purpose only to the extent it qualified as
charity, which is an enumerated exempt purpose. Over time, the charity care and community benefit requirements have eroded and health care has become an independent, but
non-statutory, exempt purpose.
60. State bar associations are I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) organizations, but there are quite a
number of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations that provide continuing legal education. At
least one for-profit company also provides continuing legal education with content
equivalent to that provided by exempt providers and at a price equivalent to exempt
providers.

61. SOl
62. Id.

BULLETIN,

supra note 6, at 93.
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exclusive marketing arrangements, commonly known as "pouring rights
contracts" in recognition of the early development of these arrangements
with respect to soft drinks. Under such an arrangement an organization
receives a fee for agreeing that a particular brand will be the only brand
of a particular product available on the property of or at an event run by
that organization. Universities with their large numbers of consumers living in a defined space controlled by the exempt organization have found
soft drink and fast food companies willing to pay fees for exclusivity. 63
These activities were not initially treated as unrelated business activities,
but the regulations now treat payments under "exclusive provider" con64
tracts as unrelated business income.
Investment earnings are also important sources of support for exempt
organizations. Exempt organizations are not simply passive investors
with low-risk investment strategies. The larger organizations, at least, are
active managers of their portfolios and engage in a wide range of securities lending activities to enhance their investment yields.
Exempt organizations also fund operations through issuing debt instruments to investors. While exempt organizations cannot issue equities,
they do issue debt. Universities are among the most active issuers of
bonds, which are secured by the projected tuition revenues. At least
some organizations, including some universities, make operational decisions with debt service and the implications on their bond ratings as important considerations.
Government grants are an increasingly important source of revenue for
exempt organizations. 65 Health care organizations and universities have
long received government grants in addition to program service support.
Smaller exempt organizations are now receiving a wide range of government grants to provide social services. 66
Since the 1996 changes in welfare, churches are one of the more important participants in these government programs. 67 But it would be fair to
say that government grants and government contracts pervade the exempt sector. This has been a phenomenon long in the making.
63. Public schools have also found these exclusivity arrangements lucrative sources of
increasing revenue. Soft drink and fast food contracts have become controversial on
grounds that young children should not be given the impression that their school endorses
these foods as a significant portion of their daily diet. The controversies become particularly acute when the exempt organization or public school is compensated as a percentage
of the sales revenue.
64. Treas. Reg. §1.513-4(c)(2)(vi)(B).
65. SOI BULLETIN, supra note 6, at 90-91.
66. The 1996 welfare reform legislation contained the charitable choice provision that
enabled faith-based charities to become government funded service providers on condition
that they did not require the recipients of the government funded services to participate in
any religious activities as a condition of participation.
67. The current administration has promulgated three Executive Orders: Establishment of the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (Jan. 29, 2001);
Agency Responsibilities with Respect to Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (Jan. 29,
2001); and Equal Protection of the Laws for Faith-Based and Community Organizations
(Dec. 12, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/orders (last visited Feb. 15,
2003).
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The Filer Commission devoted more attention to the relations of the
exempt organizations to government than it devoted to exempt organizations' relations with taxable entities. 68 The Commission found that by
1974 the government was taking direct responsibility for many activities
that had previously been the province of exempt organizations and that
the government was also becoming a major source of funds for exempt
organizations. These trends were particularly pronounced in health care,
education, and social services. 69 While acknowledging that government
funding was "a matter of life and death for many organizations," the Filer
Commission identified a "dilemma over control and finances" as one of
the central issues facing exempt organizations. 70 The Commission noted
that the government had provided significant support to exempt organizations in earlier periods in American history but also noted that this
71
practice was subject to frequent criticism.
The Filer Commission emphasized the importance of having sources of
support other than the government, observing that "memories of loyalty
oaths as a condition of government funding still are fresh, as are recollections that the institutions that resisted such pressures had private as well
as governmental resources to draw on."'72 The Commission made the
perceptive observation that staff members in organizations that are heavily dependent on the government may regard themselves more as civil
73
servants than as managers of independent organizations.
The relationship between sources of revenue and the nature of an organization's operations has never been systematically addressed. The
question of what exempt organizations do and the related question of
whether an increase in resources held by exempt organizations means an
increase in exempt activity, still cannot be answered. The reasons have
68. COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS, GIVING IN
AMERICA: TOWARD A STRONGER VOLUNTARY SECTOR 89-105 (1975) [hereinafter FILER
COMMISSION]. A survey conducted for the Filer Commission found that a sample of exempt organization leaders identified government relations as their "foremost concern." Id.
at 97.
69. Id. at 89-95.
70. This ever increasing amount of involvement by government in the finances
of nonprofit organizations presents a dilemma for the nonprofit sector. On
the one hand, government money is needed-it is a matter of life or death
for many organizations-as the number and size of nonprofit groups has
grown and the amount of private funding has, in recent years, moved relatively slowly and even fallen off as measured in deflated dollars. On the
other hand, government money obviously comes with strings attached, however invisible and unintentional they may be. The more a private nonprofit
organization depends on government money for survival, the less "private" it
is going to be, the less immune to the influence of public political processes
and priorities.
Id. at 96.
71. Id. at 96-97.
72. Id. at 98.
73. Id. at 99. The Commission found that "[t]he presence of a firm core of private
support, however small, in a private organization that gets major public funding can be of
crucial importance in determining whether the managers of the organization regard themselves and behave as independent operators or as civil servants."
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less to do with data than with concepts and the absence of an analytical
framework that facilitates consideration of these issues. Mapping patterns describing the use of particular types of resources for particular uses
helps identify the analytical issues. 74 The following section of the article
identifies the tax issues that cannot be resolved under the current law
with its entity characterization and organizational presumption.
III.

TAX IMPLICATIONS OF TREATING ORGANIZATIONS
AS ENTITIES

Treating exempt organizations as entities results in an unarticulated organizational presumption that raises two fundamental tax problems
under current law. The first problem involves the characterization of activities as exempt or not exempt and the assumption that all of the activities conducted by an exempt organization are exempt activities. Treating
organizations as entities not only obscures diversion of revenue from exempt to non-exempt activities, but also makes it more difficult to characterize particular activities as exempt or not due to the organizational
presumption that arises from the entity concept. The second problem involves the relative scope of exempt and non-exempt activities. Entity
characterization requires the articulation of the basis for determining that
an entire organization should be exempt. Current law permits an exempt
organization to engage in certain activities that are not exempt activities
but has failed to develop criteria for determining the permissible scope of
nonexempt activities.
A.

CHARACTERIZATION AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL PRESUMPTION

Characterization of the activities of exempt organizations has no coherent conceptual basis related to exemption. The problem derives, at least
in part, from treating exempt organizations as entities. Once an organization receives a determination letter recognizing that it has been organized
for one or more exempt purposes it is presumed to operate in a manner
consistent with its purposes. The tax status of the entity becomes a factor
75
in characterizing its activities.
College football is educational because it takes place in or under the
auspices of an entity that is exempt from federal income tax. 76 Professional football is a trade or business because it is conducted by for-profit
74. See infra Part IV.
75. The tautological elements of this statement are deliberate, but they are not unprecedented in tax law. The basic definition of gross income is stated as follows: "Gross income
means all income from whatever source derived." I.R.C. § 61(a) (2002).
76. Rev. Rul. 67-291, 1967-2 C.B. 184 and Rev. Rul. 64-275, 1964-2 C.B. 142 treat both
intramural athletics and intercollegiate athletics as educational within the meaning of
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Rev. Rul. 80-296, 1980-2 C.B. 195 treats the sale of broadcast rights to
an intercollegiate game as education of the public, an exempt activity.
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entities that are subject to tax. 77 Sales of greeting cards by museums are
exempt because the seller is a public charity engaged in educational activities. However, sales of the same cards by a card shop are taxable because the card shop is not qualified as an organization that serves
educational purposes within the meaning of § 501(c)(3). 78 Computer
sales by university bookstores are, if not educational themselves, sufficiently related to education to claim exemption from taxation, while computer sales by taxable vendors to students at the same university to be
used for the same course work will be taxable. 79 Even certain churches
that have become increasingly involved in multiple activities only tenuously related to churches' sacerdotal functions are exempt. 80 In each
case, the organizational presumption is a significant factor in characterizing the activity and thereby determining its tax treatment.
Problems of characterization have been particularly acute in two areas
where the tax law of exemption intersects other bodies of tax law. These
are (1) the intersection with federal election law around the prohibition
on participation or intervention in election campaigns, and (2) the intersection with the normal rules of taxation relating to commercial transactions from which exempt organizations are excepted under the broad
modifications and exceptions to the unrelated business income rules.
The difficulty of distinguishing much political activity from the exempt
activity of education has been documented but not resolved because the
activities in question are conducted by exempt organizations. 8 1 If the
same activities were conducted by political parties, they would be treated
77. The teams that comprise the National Football League ("NFL") are taxable business entities, but the NFL is an I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) trade association. As such, the NFL is
not subject to entity-level tax. I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) (2002).
78. Rev. Rul. 73-104, 1973-1 C.B. 263 treats such sales as educational because they list
the artist on the back of the card. The museum sold the cards through catalogues and also
sold the cards to commercial retail card shops at a volume discount. The ruling also suggests that the sale will build public awareness of and support for the museum selling the
card and for museums in general. The Service subsequently voiced its misgivings about the
ruling, stating that "[a]lthough we were not entirely comfortable with the frankly commercial scope of the methods of distribution in Rev. Rul. 73-104, we were unable to develop a
satisfactory legal rationale for a more restrictive rule." Gen. Couns. Mem. 37902 (Mar. 28,
1979). See also, Gen. Couns. Mem. 39346 (Mar. 15, 1985). The Service also ruled that sale
of art books and reproductions of items not included in the museum's own collection was
not unrelated business income because such sales enhanced appreciation of art in general.
Rev. Rul. 73-105, 1973-1 C.B. 264. Despite its articulated misgivings, the Service extended
this reasoning to income from shops and museums that are open off their premises. See
Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-500-03 (Sept. 8, 1995).
79. Sales of consumer goods at college bookstores are excluded from unrelated business income under the "convenience exception" based on the premise that students cannot
readily leave campus to shop. I.R.C. § 513(a)(2) (2002). The empirical basis for this position seems tenuous when so many students have automobiles and when so many retailers
are eager to locate near campuses.
80. Patricia Leigh Brown, Megachurches as Minitowns, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2002, at F1
(describing a church with multiple commercial activities that describes itself as a "destination center"). The article also describes a church with a McDonalds franchise (complete
with drive-through window) at the church, for which the church paid $100,000.
81. For a detailed analysis of the characterization issues in this area, see TAXATION OF
EXEMPr ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 4, at ch. 6.
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as campaign activities subject to federal election law. Before § 527 was
amended to require disclosure of contributors, some organizations were
using so-called "new § 527 organizations" and § 501(c)(3) or § 501(c)(4)
organizations to pay for the same televised issue ads and were successactivity and the § 501(c)(3)
fully characterizing the § 527 ads as political
82
or § 501(c)(4) ads as educational activity.
The unrelated business income tax provisions rely on the organizational presumption to ensure that few commercial activities are subject to
the unrelated business income tax. 83 The organizational presumption is
expressed through the concept that an activity is "substantially related"
to the organization's exempt purpose. 84 The same activity conducted by
a taxable entity is subject to tax.
The organizational presumption permits § 501(c)(3) organizations to
receive tax deductible contributions and use them to capitalize taxable
subsidiaries. Any dividends paid to the exempt parent are not taxed,
even if the taxable subsidiary is controlled by the exempt organization.
Interest and royalty payments from a controlled taxable subsidiary are
subject to tax under § 512(b)(13).
The organizational presumption also serves to recharacterize income
earned by joint ventures depending on the tax status of the partner receiving the income. 85 The general treatment of income from a partnership in which an exempt entity is a partner is to treat the partnership as a
flow-through entity in which the partners receive the same type of income. At least in the case of so-called whole hospital joint ventures, the
86
Service taxes the revenue according to the tax status of the partner.
Under this approach, control by the exempt entity creates a variant of the
destination of income test. The income destined for the taxable entity is
taxed and the income destined for the exempt entity is not taxed.
These characterization issues have arisen as a result of the empirical
phenomenon of convergence and are exacerbated by the conceptual limitations of the entity concept of organizations. These characterization issues are themselves the basis of the second major problem arising from
the entity approach, which is the difficulty of determining under what
circumstances an entire organization is exempt.
B.

THE SCOPE OF EXEMPT ACTIVITIES: THE COMMENSURATE IN
SCOPE STANDARD

If an organization is treated as an entity, how should tax law determine
whether the entire organization is exempt? This question is important
because the organizational presumption based on the entity concept of an
82. Id. at s 18.10.
83. See id. at ch. 21-26 for a detailed analysis of the unrelated business income tax.
84. See id. at T 22.05 for a discussion of the "substantially related" concept.
85. MICHAEL I. SANDERS, PARTNERSHIPS AND JOINT VENTURES INVOLVING TAX-ExEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. Supp. 2002).
86. Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C. B. 718.

TARGETING EXEMPTION

2003]

organization permits an exempt organization to lobby with deductible
funds, engage in a broad political range of election campaign activity with
deductible funds, and capitalize its commercial enterprises (including
those conducted in taxable subsidiaries and joint ventures with taxable
entities) with deductible funds. All of these activities depend on the entity concept and the organizational presumption. Taxable entities that engage in the same commercial activities are subject to tax on their income
and political organizations engaging in the same campaign activities are
subject to federal election law limitations and disclosure requirements.
Exempt organizations escape tax on their commercial activities and avoid
the limitations and disclosure requirements of federal election law.
It is far from clear how this happened. Section 501(c)(3) provides that
an organization is described in that section only if it is "organized and
operated exclusively" for one or more of the exempt purposes enumerated in that section. 87 In addition, the regulations provide that "[a]n organization is not organized or operated exclusively for one or more of the
purpose specified in subdivision (i) of this subparagraph unless it serves a
public rather than a private interest. ' 88 But what does "exclusively"
mean in this context? In Better Business Bureau v. United States, the Supreme Court held that even one nonexempt purpose, insubstantial in nature, was inconsistent with § 501(c)(3) status.8 9 The applicable
regulations provide that an organization is "organized exclusively for one
or more exempt purposes" only if its organizing articles expressly limit its
purposes to exempt purposes and, in addition, "[d]o not expressly empower the organization to engage, otherwise than as an insubstantial part
of its activities, in activities which in themselves are not in furtherance of
one or more exempt purposes." 90 There is no guidance on what constitutes an "insubstantial part" of an organization's activities for the organizational test. In practice, most organizations do not expressly permit any
level of activities that are not exempt apart from activities that are "in
furtherance of one or more exempt purposes." This means that there are
clauses permitting the organization to conduct administrative functions
that are necessary to operating as an organization.
The uncertainty surrounding the meaning of "exclusively" for purposes
of the operational test has been more pronounced. The regulations provide that "[a]n organization will be regarded as 'operated exclusively' for
one or more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in activities
which accomplish one more such exempt purposes specified in
§ 501(c)(3)." 91 The only additional guidance regarding the meaning of
"primarily" for this purpose is that "[a]n organization will not be so regarded if more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in further87.
88.
89.
90.

Treas. Reg.
Treas. Reg.
Better Bus.
Treas. Reg.

§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(i) (as amended in 1990).
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1990).
Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945).
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i) (as amended in 1990).

91. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (as amended in 1990).
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ance of an exempt purpose. ' 92 These two sentences read together
suggest that "primarily" is to be read as requiring that other activities are
not substantial. The UBIT regulations seem, at least to some observers,
to provide a different interpretation in the case of the conduct of a trade
or business:
An organization may meet the requirements of § 501(c)(3) although
it operates a trade or business as a substantial part of its activities, if
the operation of such trade or business is in furtherance of the organization's exempt purpose or exempt purposes and if the organization
is not organized or operated for the primary purpose of carrying on
an unrelated trade or business, as defined in § 513. In determining
the existence or nonexistence of such primary purpose, all the circumstances must be considered, including the size and extent of the
trade or business and the size and extent of the activities which are in
furtherance of one or more exempt purposes. An organization
which is organized and operated for the primary purpose of carrying
on an unrelated trade or business is not exempt under § 501(c)(3)
even though it has certain religious purposes, its property is held in
inure to the benefit of individual
common, and its profits do not
93
members of the organization.
This regulation has generally been interpreted as liberalizing the interpretation of what constitutes, primarily, an exempt purpose. The most
expansive reading of this regulation is that it permits an exempt organization to conduct commercial activities without a practical limit. 94 This
view does not represent a consensus that the Service and the courts may
be relied upon to apply. It is a reading consistent with the organizational
presumption and nicely illustrates the usefulness for large organizations
operating large commercial enterprises of failing to treat organizations as
aggregates of activities. The result has been that the statutory requirement of exclusive operation for one or more exempt purposes has become a theory requiring only a peppercorn of exempt activity embedded
in an organization that has succeeded in obtaining a determination letter
from the Service based on statements of intended exempt activities. The
conceptual nihilism reached its most complete expression in a private ruling from the Internal Revenue Service National Office that takes the position that an organization that conducted bingo games and then used
approximately one percent of its gross revenues for its articulated charitable purposes was operating exclusively for an exempt purpose. 95 How
did the Service manage to get to this position from the language of
§ 501(c)(3)?
The confusion began with the Congressional deliberations that resulted
92. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (as amended in 1990).
93. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e) (as amended in 1990).
94. Thomas A. Troyer, Quantity of Unrelated Business Consistant with CharitableExemption-Some Clarification,6 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 409 (1992).
95. Tech. Adv. Mem. 9711003 (Nov. 8, 1995).
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in the enactment of the unrelated business income tax. 96 Congress was
responding to the relationship between the several universities and taxable companies that claimed to have no taxable income because they contributed all of their net income to the university. The most famous of
these arrangements was between the New York University Law School
and C.F. Mueller Company, the pasta products company. 97 Congress was
concerned about unfair competition between businesses that paid no
taxes and those that were subject to tax, a concern which led Congressman Dingell, then a junior member of the Ways and Means Committee,
to express the concern that "[e]ventually all the noodles in this country
will be produced by corporations held or created by universities, by educational institutions, and there will be no revenue to the Federal Treasury
from this industry." 98 In the most common pattern addressed by Congress, the exempt organization conducting the exempt activities did not
also conduct the commercial activity, but instead received a contribution
or a dividend distribution from the taxable entity that claimed exemption
based on its distributions to an exempt entity. The issue of the extent of
the exempt entity's commercial activity does not arise in this pattern. The
issue was whether the commercial entity could qualify for exemption because its net earnings were used to finance exempt activities.
Congress addressed the problem of the commercial entity by denying
either an exemption or a complete charitable contribution deduction. In
so doing, Congress could be regarded as having addressed, albeit indirectly, questions relating to the extent of permissible commercial activity.
If the view that there are no limits does represent Congress' intent, then
there is little reason to argue that Mueller's should not be exempt. Distinguishing a fully controlled taxable subsidiary of an exempt parent from
a commercial enterprise conducted within the exempt organization and
accounting for 98 percent of the organization's revenue would seem to be
matters of form that should not be treated differently in substance. The
difference arose because Congress regarded the problem of the commercial enterprise's taxable income (or exempt status) as having arisen from
the destination of income test. The commercial enterprises argued that
they were exempt based on the destination of their income, namely, a
96. Hearings on the Revenue Revision of 1942 Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 77th Cong. (1942); Report on the Revenue Bill of 1943 Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, Rpt. No. 871, 78th Cong. (1943); Report on the Revenue Bill of 1943

Before the Senate Finance Comm., Rpt. No. 627, 78th Cong. (1943); Revenue Revisions,
1947-48, Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 80th Cong. (1947); Revenue Revisions of 1950, Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 81st Cong.
(1950); Revenue Revisions of 1950, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 81st

Cong. (1950).
97. C.F. Mueller Co. v. Comm'r, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'g 14 T.C. 922 (1950).
The Second Circuit had applied the destination of income test to a taxable entity that
contributed its net income to a § 501(c)(3) organization. Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Comm'r,
96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938), rev'g 35 B.T.A. 1087 (1937). It is worth emphasizing that the
Tax Court never followed the appeals courts in this matter.
98. Hearings on Revenue Revision of 1950 Before the Comm. on Ways and Means of
the House of Representatives, 81st Cong. 579-80 (1950).
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university or other exempt entity. In drafting the unrelated business income tax provisions, Congress took pains to distinguish UBIT from the
destination of income test. The legislative override of the Supreme Court
case that created the destination of income test has been interpreted, erroneously, to argue that the use of an exempt organization's resources is
irrelevant to its exempt status. This is a logical leap that is inconsistent
with the Congressional action. Congress thought it was addressing the
issue of characterization of various income as unrelated business income,
not addressing the question of the scope of the exempt activities conducted by an organization claiming to operate "exclusively" for an exempt purpose. One could argue that Congress should have addressed the
question of the scope of permissible UBIT, but it might be excused for
thinking that the "exclusively" standard in § 501(c)(3) was sufficient.
The Service, undoubtedly responding to insightful advocacy, intensified
the confusion in its first public ruling on a case in which the exempt entity
conducted its own commercial activities. In the Field Foundation ruling,
Revenue Ruling 64-182, the service ruled that a § 501(c)(3) organization
that derived its revenue from the rental of a large commercial building
that it owned, and that used its revenue to make grants to other
§ 501(c)(3) organizations, was itself exempt because "it is shown to be
carrying on through such contributions and grants a charitable program
commensurate in scope with its financial resources." 99 The Service based
this determination on the regulation permitting an exempt organization
to conduct a substantial trade or business, 10 0 but made no reference to
either that section's reference to the primacy of exempt activities or to
the regulations defining the statutory concept "exclusively" as "primary."' 10 It is difficult to determine how this pattern differs from the
relationship between Mueller's and the New York University Law
School. In each case, one entity earned revenue from commercial activities and directed its net revenue to one or more entities conducting exempt activities. The Service took the position that making contributions
and grants constituted exempt activities. Accepting this argument should
mean that Mueller's would qualify for exemption since it, in substance,
made an annual contribution to the New York University Law School.
One difference was that Mueller's did not characterize its payment as a
contribution but as a dividend. The Service has never addressed the implications of this distinction.
The "commensurate in scope" standard could be reconciled with the
concept that an organization is exempt only if it operates primarily for an
exempt purpose. Doing so would require that the Service develop guidance regarding what criteria should be used. This, in turn, would require
that the Service look directly at the activities conducted by the exempt
organizations, and that it pay attention to the noun in determining
99. Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964-1 C.B. 186.
100. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e) (as amended in 1990).
101. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c) (as amended in 1990).
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whether the adjective is appropriate. But, instead of offering this guidance, the Service has generally ignored the issue. By 1997 the Service
ruled that an exempt organization that transformed itself into a bingo
operator was exempt even though only one percent of its revenue was
used for exempt activities.' 0 2 The ruling states that the organization
claimed that it devoted 50 percent of its time to conducting bingo operations and 41 percent of its time to conducting exempt activities. 10 3 There
is no information in the ruling relating to the basis for these percentages
or the implications of the admission that less than half of its time was
devoted to exempt activities. Such issues would seem to be important in
light of the minimal amount of its revenue devoted to exempt purposes.
By 1998 the Service had reached the point of stating that cases about the
extent of unrelated business activity should not be litigated because of the
hazards of litigation.' 0 4 This ruling did not rely directly on the commensurate in scope test, stating that this test had been used primarily in the
case of organizations that did not conduct exempt activities directly but
made contributions to other organizations conducting exempt activities.
The basis for this distinction remains unexplored.
The difficulties presented by the "commensurate in scope" test for determining the exempt status of an entire organization become more acute
when one tries to conceptualize the process of determining whether an
organization that lobbies and engages in commercial activities should be
exempt. Does one simply add the amount of money devoted to each?
The amount of staff time (or staff and volunteer time) devoted to each?
Are commercial activities that are "substantially related" to the organization's exempt purpose for UBIT purposes properly treated as exempt or
rather as commercial activities for purposes of the commensurate in
scope test? Or does one simply ignore the entire issue so that the bingo
operator model becomes the common model throughout the exempt sector? If one pursues this course, why should taxable entities that fund
their own company foundations or make contributions to other exempt
entities face the deduction limits currently imposed under § 170? The
allowance for an insubstantial amount of private benefits adds yet another layer of complexity. How does one account for any such private
benefit that does not in itself jeopardize exempt status? Is it aggregated
with other activities that do not in themselves support exemption? Under
this approach, an insubstantial amount of private benefit would not jeopardize exempt status unless the organization also engaged in enough
UBIT, together with enough lobbying, to produce a different result.
These puzzles have no resolution in current law. Indeed, these questions are never asked. Once they are asked, there is no coherent basis for
determining whether an exempt organization is operating exclusively for
102. Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-11-003 (Nov. 8, 1995).
103. The organization did not conduct exempt activities directly, but, like the Field
Foundation, made contributions to other § 501(c)(3) organizations.
104. Field Serv. Adv. 19991007 (Nov. 24, 1998).
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an exempt purpose. In short, the statutory requirement has become a
nullity. This is the basis of charitable inefficiency under current law. The
difficulty of suggesting that the concept of an exempt organization has
any meaning under current law can be illustrated by the following hypothetical. An organization uses 40 percent of its revenue to increase its
unrelated business activity, 20 percent for lobbying, and 15 percent for
issue ads during a presidential campaign. Such an organization would in
all likelihood be exempt under current law.
Even if these issues of characterization and scope were resolved, diversion would continue (albeit on a reduced scale), and the exemption would
continue to be inefficient. The response proposed here is to apply a
nondiversion constraint at the level of particular activities funded from
particular sources of revenue and forego any attempt to determine how
to define an exempt organization as an entity.
IV. MAPPING PATTERNS OF DIVERSION
If an exempt organization is understood as an aggregate of transactions
through which various sources of revenue are used to fund particular activities, each with a distinctive relationship to exemption, the next step is
to map the intersections of sources and uses of revenue inside § 501(c)(3)
public charities. Figure 1 presents such a map. The patterns of diversion
noted in Figure 1 highlight transactions that define charitable inefficiency
and, in certain cases, abuse of the nonprofit, tax-exempt form.
Figure 1: Patterns of Diversion
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Characterizing certain intersections of sources and uses as diversions
leads to the question: diversion from what? In the case of § 501(c)(3)
organizations, the answer is more complex than simply a diversion from
the purposes enumerated in § 501(c)(3). The broader concept based on
the structure of exemption is that the diversion in question is a diversion
from the provision of a public benefit to a class of charitable benefi-
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ciaries. This is the purpose of structuring § 501(c)(3) organizations as recipients of deductible charitable contributions under § 170.
Mapping diversion from the provision of a public benefit to a charitable class of beneficiaries provides the empirical basis for examination of
the claim that all sources of income are used for exempt activities. The
claim that charitable use of the revenues justifies engaging in a broad
range of commercial activities becomes more difficult to sustain when it
becomes clear that the commercial activities may be funded with deductible charitable contributions, or private foundation grants, or program service revenue. There is no barrier to any of these patterns of diversion
under current law. The question addressed here is whether such uses are
consistent with charitable efficiency or whether exemption should be
more carefully targeted to activities that are more directly related to the
exempt purposes that provide the basis for exemption and the charitable
contribution deduction.
The approach to mapping taken here is to examine the patterns that
emerge from devoting each of the five sources of income to each of the
four uses. This exercise begins with charitable contributions, then considers, in order, program service revenue, private foundation grants, commercial activities, and government grants. Other categories might be
used, but these sources of revenue capture the primary sources of revenue for § 501(c)(3) organizations.
Uses of Charitable Contributions
The category of deductible contributions encompasses contributions
from all types of contributors, including taxable corporations and foreign
persons, both natural and corporate. Distinctions among contributors
create no technical or policy issues when the contributions are used to
support exempt activities. Distinctions among contributors do create
technical and policy issues when they are used for legislative lobbying or
for electoral campaign activities.
The use of contributions for commercial activities is a clear case of diversion. Current law imposes virtually no tax on commercial activities
and there is no guidance on the issue of how much unrelated business
income is consistent with exempt status apart from the general requirement that activities that further the organization's exempt purposes must
05
be the organization's primary activity.
Under current law, § 501(c)(3) organizations may engage in some
amount of lobbying. Again, the scope is uncertain, especially under the
"no substantial part" test. 0 6 Whatever amount of lobbying is permissible, lobbying is not an exempt activity that itself supports exemption as
105. For a discussion of the commensurate in scope standard, see supra Part III.B.
106. Two tests are the "substantial part" test of Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-t(c)(3) and the
"expenditure" test of § 501(h) and § 4911. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3) (as amended in
1990); I.R.C. § 501(h) (2002); I.R.C. § 4911 (2002). See TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATrIoNs, supra note 4, at ch. 5.
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an organization described in § 501(c)(3). 10 7 There is no requirement that
lobbying be on legislation related to the organization's exempt purposes.
Because lobbying is not an exempt activity and there is no requirement
that lobbying be limited to issues related to the organization's exempt
purpose, one might treat any amount of lobbying using deductible charitable contributions as a diversion. On the other hand, one might treat a
level of lobbying consistent with exempt status as a quasi-exempt use but
not a diversion. One might wish to refine the concept by treating lobbying on issues related to the organization's exempt purpose as an exempt
activity for purposes of mapping patterns of diversion. Because excess
lobbying is inconsistent with exempt status, any amount of deductible
charitable contributions used to fund excess lobbying should be treated as
a diversion. Conceptualizing exempt organizations as aggregates of
transactions and mapping patterns of diversion permits a more nuanced
analysis of lobbying than simply treating it as either entirely consistent
with exemption or entirely inconsistent with exemption.
Electoral campaign activities present a characterization dilemma. 10 8
Much of the electoral activity of § 501(c)(3) organizations takes the form
of print or mass media "issue ads" that have elements of public education
as well as participation or intervention in a political campaign and perhaps even legislative lobbying. 0 9 The Service has issued no precedential
guidance in this area for more than twenty years, during which time the
entire manner of financing and conducting electoral campaigns has been
transformed by the increased importance of soft money and the efforts to
limit it.' 10 Some activities that shape electoral outcomes qualify as exempt activities. The result is that what are in substance campaign contributions qualify for the § 170 charitable contribution deduction and evade
the limitations and disclosure requirements of federal election law."'
107. Lobbying is an exempt activity for § 501(c)(4) organizations, but § 504 provides
that a § 501(c)(3) organization that loses its exempt status due to excessive lobbying cannot
restructure itself as a § 501(c)(4) organization. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2002); I.R.C. § 504
(2002).

108. For a detailed discussion of these characterization issues, see
supra note 4, at ch. 6.
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109. For an analysis of these overlapping characterizations and the issues that arise with
respect to these intersections, see Hill, Softer Money, supra note 3.
110. Rev. Rul. 78-284, 1978-1 C.B. 154; Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178. The Service

has issued two nonprecedential articles in its Continuing Professional Education Text. See
Judith Kindell & Jack Reilly, Election Year Issues, in Internal Revenue Service Exempt Organizations Continuing Professional Education Technical Instruction Program, reprinted in
94 TAX NOTES TODAY 70-28 (1994); Judith Kindell & John Francis Reilly, Election Year
Issues, in Internal Revenue Service Exempt Organizations Continuing Professional Education Technical Instruction Program, reprinted in 2001 TAX NoTEs TODAY 193-50 (2001).
111. There is nothing particular new in these issues. They date to at least the 1988

general election, when several candidates had used § 501(c)(3) organizations to raise deductible contributions from core contributors. This technique became quite controversial
after the House of Representative imposed a sanction on then-Speaker Newt Gingrich.
See generally House Comm. on Ethics, In the Matter of Representative Newt Gingrich, H.R.

REP. No. 105-1 (1997). In perhaps the most inexplicable ruling position it has ever taken in
this area, the Service ruled that an organization which served as the funding structure for
the activities that led to Gingrich's difficulties did not engage in prohibited political cam-

2003]

TARGETING EXEMPTION

This means that foreign persons, corporations, unions, and otherwise
qualifying contributors who have reached the contribution limitation imposed by federal election law may turn to a § 501(c)(3) organization as a
vehicle for so-called issue ads and a broad range of other forms of support for candidates for public office.
In this case, diversion within the organization becomes a means of using one statute to avoid and evade the requirements of another. Any
intersection of two or more statutes creates opportunities for "statutory
arbitrage" of this kind. This issue is perhaps the most difficult issue facing § 501(c)(3) organizations. To the extent that § 501(c)(3) organizations become the favored structure for electoral abuse, it will be difficult
for § 501(c)(3) organizations to claim that their favored tax status is based
on the public good that they uniquely provide.
Even without the opportunities for statutory arbitrage, electoral activity is a diversion. As in the case of legislative lobbying, there is no requirement that even permissible types of electoral activity be
substantially related to an organization's exempt purpose or purposes.
Any effort to craft such a requirement would fail because candidates take
so many shifting positions on so many issues. Therefore, there would be
no reliable basis for determining whether any candidate's actual positions
would be consisat the time of a particular vote or even legislative debate
12
tent with any one organization's exempt purposes.'
Certain forms of electoral activity are prohibited and, in theory, engaging in such activities results in revocation of exemption. The Service has
been reluctant to revoke exemption on these grounds. Congress responded to this reluctance by imposing an excise tax on the organization
and its managers in cases of excess political activity. 1 13 The § 4955 excise
tax presents the logical conundrum of allowing an organization to engage
114
in prohibited activity if it pays a toll charge in the form of an excise tax.
paign activity. See Tech. Adv. Mem. (unreleased), reprinted in 1999 TAX NOTES TODAY

24-25. This ruling has never been released as a published private letter ruling because it
resulted in no change in the status of the organization. The Service's position was crafted
by the National Office after the Baltimore District Office had recommended that the Progress and Freedom Foundation be found to have engaged in prohibited political activity.
See Memorandum from Paul G. Accettura, Chief Counsel's Office, Employee Benefits and
Exempt Organizations, to Diane Crosby, District Consel's Office, Delaware-Maryland District (May 3, 1997) (responding to a draft adverse letter ruling), reprinted in 2000 TAX
NOTES TODAY 51-16 (2000); see also Memorandum from Sarah Hall Ingram, Associate

General Counsel, Employee Benefits and Exempt Organizations, to the District Counsel,
Delaware-Maryland District (December 30, 1997) (disagreeing with a proposed adverse
position), reprinted in 2000 TAX NoTEs TODAY 51-17 (2000).

112. There are good reasons apart from purely tactical considerations for candidates to
take such positions. Legislatures work through accommodation and the formation of shifting coalitions.
113. Section 4955, which was added to the Code in the Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 (1987).

114. Section 4958 raises the same issues with respect to inurement and excessive
amounts of private benefit, both of which in theory not only support but require denial or
revocation of exemption.
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At the same time, it is an example of taxing an activity rather than revoking the exemption of the entire organization.
Uses of Program Service Revenue
Program service revenue is revenue earned by performing the exempt
activity that forms the basis for the organization's exemption. Patient
fees charged by hospitals and tuition charged by educational institutions
are the leading examples of program revenue. Like charitable contributions, program service revenue can be used for any of the activities that
an exempt organization performs. Use of program service revenue for
the exempt activity that produces the revenue is a form of market charity,
but it is not a diversion.
Mapping the sources and uses of money helps clarify the confusion that
has arisen from describing organizations that generate program service
revenue as "commercial nonprofits." This term conflates the idea of diversion with the concept of convergence. If program service revenue is
used to fund the exempt activity producing such revenue, then there is no
diversion, but instead a reinvestment in exempt activity. If program service revenue is used for commercial activities there is diversion. Diversion depends on the use of the revenue, not on the commercial form of a
sale of services that defines the transactions through which program service revenue is earned. This paradigmatic diversion is obscured by the
term "commercial nonprofit," which is based on the form of the transaction through which the revenue is earned, not on the use of the revenue.
This distinction is never considered if organizations are treated as entities
and there is no analysis of the uses of revenue inside the entity.
The analysis of diversion of program service revenue for legislative lobbying parallels the analysis of the use of charitable contributions for legislative lobbying. Similarly, analysis of the funding of electoral campaign
activities with program service revenue parallels the analysis of the diversion involved in funding such activities with charitable contributions. In
both cases, however, there is one difference that relates to issues of monitoring and accountability. Program service revenue is not a voluntary
contribution, but rather a purchase of a benefit. Patients at a hospital or
students at a university are not contributors who can withdraw their contributions at no cost to themselves. In this sense, contributors have
greater discretion to take action in the event of diversion, if they learn of
or even suspect diversion, than do patients or students. Tuition-paying
students or fee-paying patients are more like members of a business
league who join for economic reasons and then find that the organization
is using their dues to support candidates whom they themselves may not
support. The students or patients have few, if any, options to acquire the
services they are purchasing from another provider. In this situation, the
Supreme Court has held that the use of the organization's treasury funds
for political campaign activity is an impermissible diversion of funds from
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the organization's exempt purpose. 115 If an organization's sole purpose is
to take positions on a well-defined issue, then the Court has not found
the same diversion from the organization's exempt purpose. In effect, the
Court found that the political activity was related to the organization's
exempt purpose, although it did not base its decision on this reasoning,
but rather found that members could leave the organization with no cost
116
to any other interest related to the organization's exempt purpose.
Uses of Private Foundation Grants
Private foundation grants differ from § 170 contributions in the sanctions imposed on the contributing private foundation in cases where uses
of the grant by the recipient organization are inconsistent with the requirements of § 501(c)(3) and the private foundation requirements. This
pattern of sanctions is a limited indirect form of a nondiversion constraint. The sanctions fall on the private foundation, however, and not on
the § 501(c)(3) recipient organization that actually engaged in the
diversion.
Private foundations may fund the exempt activities of § 501(c)(3) public charities. The consequences to the private foundation for funding
commercial activities are less clear. Private foundations themselves are
subject to limitations on their investment strategies and their commercial
investments that do not apply to public charities. 1 7 Private foundations
may invest in program-related investments that are commercial in both
form and substance and still achieve an exempt purpose.' 18
Clearer limitations apply in the case of lobbying and political activity.t 1 9 Section 4945(d)(1) provides that a private foundation may not, directly or indirectly, engage in legislative lobbying. The lobbying
regulations applicable to public charities that receive grants from private
foundations contain rules aimed at ensuring that private foundations that
fund public charities that lobby are not treated as having made taxable
120
expenditures based on the lobbying activities of the public charities.
Section 4945(d)(1) contains quite broad exceptions that have the effect of
confining the definition of lobbying for this purpose to activities centering
on actual contact with legislators and their staffs. 12 1 The sanctions applicable under § 4945(d)(1) apply only to the private foundation providing
the funding, and not to the public charity using the funds for activities
triggering the sanctions. In this sense, the sanctions are misplaced and
115. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990); Communi-

cations Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1987).
116. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
117. These requirements are the jeopardizing investments provisions of § 4944 and the
excess business holdings provisions of § 4943.
118. I.R.C. § 4944(c); Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3.
119. Because public charities have become so dependent on private foundation grants,
certain public charities argue that limitations on advocacy using private foundation funding
either do not exist or should be eliminated.
120. Section 4945 imposes an excise tax on such taxable expenditures.
121. Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-2(d) (as amended in 1990).
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inefficient because the private foundation faces considerable barriers to
22
monitoring.1
Section 4945(d)(2) contains parallel rules relating to electoral campaign activities. If a private foundation funds a public charity that engages in electoral campaign activities that a private foundation could not
engage in directly, the private foundation will be treated as having made
a taxable expenditure. 123 Here, too, there are quite broad exceptions for
nonpartisan voter registration and nonpartisan assistance to voters in
reaching the polls.' 2 4 Under § 4945(d)(2) the sanctions fall on the private

foundation that funded the taxable expenditure, not on the public charity
that used the funds for the activity triggering the sanction. Responsibility
for preventing impermissible uses by grant recipients is placed on the private foundation making the grant. This prevents collusion between the
private foundation and the recipient organizations, but it does not address diversion by the public charity.
Uses of Revenue from Commercial Activities
Revenue from commercial activities can also be used for any of the
activities undertaken by the exempt organization earning the commercial
revenue. Commercial activities are both sources and uses of revenue. It
may seem incongruous to refer to diversion in the case of commercial
revenues. The diversion framework applies, however, due to the rationale commonly advanced for not limiting the amount of commercial activity that is consistent with exempt status. The rationale is based on the
assertion that revenue from commercial activities is used for the organization's exempt activities. This claim would treat both commercial activities and program service revenue as forms of self-funding. It is generally
not possible to prove or disprove this assertion. Mapping the sources and
uses of money and crafting a nondiversion constraint that addresses patterns of diversion will provide information on the empirical basis for such
a claim and apply sanctions in cases in which it is not correct. The rationale is described by the shorthand of an internal contribution here. 125 If,
however, the commercial activities lose money or simply break even,
there is no revenue to distribute to exempt activities.1 26
122. See Part II for a discussion on organizational opacity and limits on disclosure.
Also see Part V for a discussion of whether the nondiversion constraint should be directed
at the organization or its officers and directors or both.
123. See TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 4, $ 11.03 (discussing taxable expenditures that do not satisfy the minimum distribution requirements of § 4942).

124. Id. at $ 11.03[3].
125. One might also describe it as an internal destination of income concept. It parallels the claim pursued successfully in Trinidad v. SagradaOrden de Predicadores,263 U.S.
578 (1924). Current law, however, provides a § 170 deduction and not an exemption from
tax.
126. The Business Venture Division of the Smithsonian Institution experienced substantial losses during the past fiscal year, and such losses resulted in staff cuts and adverse
effects on exempt activities. See Jacqueline Trescott, Smithsonian Hurt by Drop in Tourism, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2002, at C1.
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Reinvestment of profits in the commercial enterprise is treated here as
a diversion. In this sense, it contrasts with the reinvestment of program
service revenue in the exempt activity that produced it. One response to
this analysis is to say that reinvestment may only defer the internal contribution. In this sense, the case of commercial revenue raises the same
deferral issue raised by endowments or by set-asides. At the same time,
reinvestment in the exempt organization's commercial activities introduces an element of indirectness that distinguishes such reinvestment
in commercial activities from a set-aside by a private foundation for a
12 7
particular identified exempt activity.
The use of commercial revenue for lobbying in some aspects parallels
the prior analysis of lobbying. It also, however, raises the issue of comparison with the treatment of lobbying expenses incurred by taxable enterprises. This is an appropriate comparison because both organizations
have engaged in the same kind of market transactions to produce the
income. Conceptualizing an exempt organization as an aggregate of
transactions-as a nexus of the multiple sources and uses of revenue
rather than as undifferentiated entities-facilitates this comparison. Taxable entities may not deduct their lobbying expenses as ordinary and necessary business expenses, even if the legislation in question relates
directly to the corporation's business. 128 Dues paid to a trade association
are not deductible to the extent that the trade association incurs lobbying
expenses.' 29 In the case of a § 501(c)(3) organization, in contrast, commercial revenue is not subject to any tax because it falls outside the narrow definition of the unrelated business income tax that can be used to
fund lobbying with respect to legislation, whether or not such legislation
is related to the exempt organization's exempt purpose. Based on the
preceding analysis, this is diversion.
The use of revenue from commercial activities for electoral campaign
activities is also a diversion and presents a contrast with the treatment of
commercial revenue generated by taxable entities, including those engaged in the same kind of commercial activities. The use of commercial
revenue for election activity should be subject to the same FECA
prohibitions that apply to taxable entities.
Uses of Revenue from Government Grants and Contracts
Government grants and contracts generally require accounting that
matches the government funding with approved uses and separate accounting for the funds.130 The use of government funds for exempt activities is labeled here state charity, and the use of government funds for
127. Section 501(c)(3) public charities have no such provision because they are not subject to the minimum distribution requirement applicable to private foundations under
§ 4942.
128. I.R.C. § 162(e) (2002).
129. I.R.C. § 162(e)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-28.
130. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-110 (as amended in 1999), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a11O/a11O.html.
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commercial activities is labeled state capitalism. Use of government
funds for lobbying is prohibited. 13 1 The FECA prohibits contributions or
independent expenditures from corporations that are government contractors, although it is far from clear that this prohibition encompasses all
forms of issue advocacy that has the result and the intention of influencing electoral outcomes.
V. TARGETING EXEMPTION THROUGH A
NONDIVERSION CONSTRAINT
Tax expenditure analysis treats tax benefits as the equivalent of direct
expenditures in terms of their impact on government budgets. 132 The
§ 170 charitable contribution deduction is treated as a tax expenditure in
the annual tax expenditure budgets, but the § 501(a) exemption has never
been treated as a tax expenditure for this purpose. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has brought both the § 170 charitable contribution deduction and the § 501(a) exemption within the analytical framework of tax
expenditure analysis by treating both as government subsidies.13 3
Much of the discussion of tax expenditures focuses on whether taxbased programs operate as efficiently as direct expenditure programs. In
her thoughtful consideration of the earned income tax credit, Anne Alstott pointed out that using tax-based programs rather than direct government expenditures raises issues of accuracy, responsiveness, and
compliance. 134 She concluded that a tax-based system resulted in "less
accurate targeting" than did direct payments. 135 The issue raised here is
which tax regime targets the benefits of exemption to exempt activities by
differentiating among the various types of activities conducted by contemporary exempt organizations.
The nondistribution constraint as expressed for tax purposes in the
three private benefit doctrines represents a general anti-abuse provision
that provides little basis for monitoring the most relevant aspects of the
organization. The nondiversion constraint proposed here represents an
effort to target the tax benefit rather than simply to rely on the more
general organization-level anti-abuse approach. 136 The purpose of targeting is not to deny exemption to entire organizations but to create taxbased incentives to use the charitable contribution deduction and the ex131. The sponsor of this legislation had originally tried to prohibit any lobbying by an
organization that received government funds.
132. Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy:
A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970); Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace
Tax Expenditures with Direct Government Assistance, 84 HARV. L. REV. 352 (1970).
133. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
134. Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of a TaxBased Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1995).
135. Id. at 589.
136. For an earlier consideration of targeting that focused on the § 170 charitable contribution deduction, see Paul R. McDaniel, FederalMatching Grantsfor CharitableContributions: A Substitute for the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L. REv. 377 (1972).
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emption to direct resources to exempt activities. This is the essence of

charitable efficiency.
The technical tax mechanism for a nondiversion constraint depends on
looking inside an exempt organization to take account of the internal
transactions by which revenue from particular sources is committed to
particular uses. 1 37 Targeting exemption depends on providing more
favorable tax treatment for revenues used for exempt activities than for
revenues used for activities that are merely consistent with exempt status
or for activities that are inconsistent with exempt status.
The initial issue is whether the sanctions should fall on the sources of
revenue or on the organization or on the organization managers. 138 This
article defines the problem as information asymmetry arising from the
opacity and hierarchy of exempt organizations. Hansmann also defined
the problem as information asymmetry, but did not link it as directly to
organization managers as this article does. As Hansmann noted, the purpose of a nondistribution constraint is to give contributors confidence
that their contributions will be used as warranted by the organization.
That is also one of the purposes of a nondiversion constraint. Contributors who give money to an organization for its exempt activities may not
want the organization to use the money to support its taxable subsidiary,
legislative lobbying, or election campaign activities. Under current law,
contributors have no right to monitor the use of their contributions absent a specific agreement with the organization. Agreements regarding
particular uses are negotiated with respect to large contributions, but not
with respect to average contributions. The controversies that erupted
around the use of funds that contributors thought had been solicited on
behalf of the September 11th victims offers the clearest case of contributor disaffection that we have seen. Many of these controversies continue
without any resolution satisfactory to the contributors or the intended
beneficiaries.
In addition to Hansmann's expressed concern with contributors' confidence in exempt organizations, there is an issue virtually unexplored in
the academic literature relating to exempt organizations or in policy discussions relating to exemption, namely, the confidence that beneficiaries
have in exempt organizations. These issues are most evident in cases of
clearly identified beneficiaries. The September 11th victims and their
families are one such charitable class, and it is not surprising that they
have demanded a role in the administration of funds collected for their
benefit. It is also not surprising that a storm of controversy erupted over
Congressional testimony given by the Service suggesting that benefi137. The model developed above identified twenty such transactions. As noted in that
discussion, it would be possible to divide certain categories, which would increase the number of transactions, or to combine some or all of the categories of non-exempt uses, which
would reduce the number of transactions.
138. The organization itself becomes a source of revenue when it engages in revenueproducing commercial activities.
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ciaries have no legitimate role in monitoring exempt organizations.' 39
The opacity and lack of accountability of most exempt organizations
support placing sanctions on the organization and its managers, not on
contributors. By imposing the tax on the organization and its managers,
innocent contributors are protected from the loss of a charitable contribution deduction where they are powerless to prevent the diversion of
their contribution. Except in cases of collusion, which may occur most
commonly in cases involving political activities, the diversion occurs at
the level of the organization and at the behest of organization managers.
In the case of any diversion of charitable contributions that qualify for
the § 170 charitable contribution deduction, an excise tax will apply to
organization managers on the model of § 4955 or § 4958 as well as a
transfer tax payable by the organization.
Once it has been decided to place sanctions on the user of the revenue,
the next question becomes whether the organization itself, the organization managers, or both should be subject to sanctions. This article, having
identified information asymmetry as the fundamental problem, opts for
placing sanctions on both the organization and its managers. Section
4958 sanctions only managers and disqualified persons, the two parties to
an excess benefit transaction. Section 4955, in contrast, sanctions both
the organization and its managers, apparently on grounds that the organization's resources have been diverted to prohibited uses, in this case, prohibited electoral campaign activity. The nondiversion constraint follows
the reasoning of § 4955 in this respect.
Crafting the elements of a nondiversion constraint applicable to the
organization and its managers begins with the accounting requirement
that revenue from each of these five sources be placed in separate accounts and that the four distinct types of activities also be funded from
separate accounts. An organization could then have up to nine accounts-five source accounts and four use accounts. The degree of
acounting complexity reflects and is determined by the organization's operational complexity. Small organizations are less likely to have multiple
sources of revenue used for multiple activities than are large organizations, thus the administrative burden on small organizations should not
be a barrier to considering a nondiversion constraint. At the same time,
it should be possible to define a small organization exception at some
reasonable level of average annual resources.
The purpose of these two accounting requirements is to permit tracking
of transfers from a source account to a use account. This is the accounting basis of operational transparency and the informational predicate of
organizational accountability. This kind of accounting permits an organi139. Response by Charitable Organizations to the Recent Terrorist Attacks: Hearing

Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Steven
Miller, Tax Exempt Government Entities Division, Internal Revenue Service). The Service almost immediately moderated its position. I.R.S. Notice 2001-78, 2001-50 I.R.B. 1
(accompanied by a Statement of Commissioner Charles 0. Rossotti (Nov. 16, 2001), reprinted in 2001 TAX NOTES TODAY 223-71 (2001)).
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zation to provide evidence that revenue from its commercial activities is
in fact used to fund exempt activities. It also permits the organization
managers to document the economic performance of their commercial
ventures as well as the organization's ability to sustain them without diverting resources from the organization's charitable mission. In this
sense, a nondiversion constraint is a management tool that well-managed
140
exempt organizations should already be using.
The operational transparency resulting from this kind of accounting
would enable board members of large and small organizations to perform
their roles more effectively. It would be clear to all the board members,
most of whom will not be accountants or lawyers, how the charitable contributions are being used, how the revenue from commercial activity is
being used, how private foundation grants are being used, and how government contract or grant funds are being used. None of this information
is available in comprehensible form if accounts are commingled. Tracking transfers permits a test of the common justification of commercial
activities in terms of the use of the funds for exempt purposes. If, and to
the extent, that this proves to be the case, that transaction can be identified and the appropriate tax treatment applied to it.
If the first step in crafting a nondiversion constraint is to identify specific transactions between source accounts and use accounts within the
organization, the next step is to design a series of tax sanctions for diverting revenue to nonexempt uses. Targeting tax exemption means that exempt uses should be tax-favored and all other uses should be, to some
degree, disfavored in their tax treatment. This regime of targeting can be
achieved with a series of transfer taxes imposed on transfers from source
accounts to use accounts within the organization. The transfers that arise
under the analytical framework developed here are listed in Figure 2.
The following discussion parallels the prior discussion of mapping diversion by discussing transfers from each source of revenue to each of the
four uses identified here.

140. In the wake of the financial scandals involving the United Way of the National
Capital Area, the president and chief executive officer of the United Way of America
announced that the organization has adopted new accounting procedures "making it easier
for donors and the public to understand our financial practices." He also noted that donors now want detailed accounting information before they will entrust their funds to an
organization. See Peter Woriskey, National United Way Sets Fiscal Changes: Local Group
Told to Alter Accounting, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2001, at B01.
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Figure 2: Transactions Identifying Exempt Activities and Diversions
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Charitable contributions used for exempt activities;
Charitable contributions used for commercial activities;
Charitable contributions used for legislative lobbying;
Charitable contributions used for political campaign activities;
Program service revenue used for exempt activities;
Program service revenue used for commercial activities;
Program service revenue used for legislative lobbying;
Program service revenue used for political campaign activities;
Commercial revenue used for exempt activities;
Commercial revenue used to support commercial activities;
Commercial revenue used for legislative lobbying;
Commercial revenue used for political campaign activities;
Foundation grants used for exempt activities;
Foundation grants used for commercial activities;
Foundation grants used for legislative lobbying;
Foundation grants used for political campaign activities;
Government grants used for exempt activities;
Government grants used for commercial activities;
Government grants used for legislative lobbying;
Government grants used for political campaign activities.

Transfer Taxes on Uses of Charitable Contributions
This system operates most clearly in the case of charitable contributions. Any charitable contributions used for exempt activities will not be
subject to an internal transfer tax. An organization that receives contributions and uses them for its exempt activities will have one source account and one use account. Any amounts in the source account not used
currently will be held as an endowment. 14 1
Charitable contributions used for commercial activities will be subject
to transfer taxes at the point that revenue is transferred from the contributions source account to the commercial use account. This is the essence of the nondiversion constraint. The current tax regime imposes no
tax on the non-exempt use but does impose a tax on revenue earned from
commercial ventures. The tax is imposed only in the increasingly rare
event that the commercial activity cannot be characterized in a way that
eludes characterization as unrelated business income or falls within one
of the numerous modifications and exceptions to the definition of unrelated taxable income.
Even if the revenue is characterized as unrelated business income, the
unrelated business income tax is a perverse incentive to using funds for
exempt activities because it provides the greatest subsidy to poorly run
141. Endowments raise questions of deferred use for future exempt activities. But endowments represent the same issue of diversion as do current accounts. This issue is addressed in the private foundation provisions that require that set asides be designated for
identified exempt activities. The endowments of public charities might be subject to this
requirement. Taxable entities are also subject to some limitation on accumulation through
the § 531 accumulated earnings tax.

2003]

TARGETING EXEMPTION

commercial enterprises. If the commercial activities generate no revenue,
there is no tax. Taxing revenue does not address the original diversion
transaction.
This article focuses on the proposition that even if the internal problem
of the unrelated business income tax were addressed, the diversion issue
would remain. While more revenue resulting from commercial activities
would be taxed, the diversion transfer, which is the core of charitable
inefficiency, would remain unaddressed and the exemption would remain
untargeted and inefficient. If a § 501(c)(3) organization transferred its
revenue from charitable contributions to an unrelated taxable entity, that
transfer would be inconsistent with continued exempt status, unless the
§ 501(c)(3) transferor could establish that the taxable entity was achieving the same exempt purpose that the charitable entity was achieving.
The limits of this reasoning are posed by two hypotheticals involving
transfers by Harvard University of it alumnae/i contributions to taxable
entities. 142 In the first case, Harvard transfers its alumnae/i contributions
to the John Deere Company, a taxable manufacturer of farm machinery
and lawn mowers. In the second case, Harvard transfers its alumnae/i
contributions to the University of Phoenix, a taxable university. Apart
from the likely uproar from the Harvard alumnae/i, the Service would
have a problem identifying what is wrong under current law. There is no
private benefit from the transfer itself in either case, even though the
additional revenue received from Harvard might be used by the taxable
recipients to distribute dividends or increase staff salaries. In the second
case, assuming that the University of Phoenix invested the capital contribution in its educational activities, would the use of the funds for an activity that is one of the enumerated § 501(c)(3) purposes mean that Harvard
was engaging in an exempt activity through the University of Phoenix?
Why does this transaction seem inconsistent with Harvard's continued
exemption?
Charitable contributions used for legislative lobbying, which under current law includes initiative and referendum campaigns, also represent a
form of diversion, but the diversion is less clear than it is in the case of
commercial activities. Legislative lobbying is a permissible activity,
within limits, but not an exempt activity for a § 501(c)(3) organization.
This means that a § 501(c)(3) organization cannot be organized solely or
primarily for legislative lobbying. At the same time, because § 170 is
written in terms of contributions to particular types of organizations,
there is no limitation on the use of deductible charitable contributions for
legislative lobbying. Arguably, legislative lobbying implicates issues of
democratic participation that transcend tax issues. But, at the same time,
as the Supreme Court held in Taxation with Representation, exemption
142. Such a transfer would be treated as a capital contribution to the taxable entity by a
non-shareholder, assuming Harvard held no stock in either corporation, within the meaning of § 118 and Treas. Reg. § 1.118-1. If Harvard held stock in the taxable entity, the
capital contribution would increase its basis in its existing shares.
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represents a subsidy, and conditions on the terms under which that subsidy is granted are not an impermissible burden on the First Amendment
143
rights of speech and association.
Two approaches to the transfer tax in the event of lobbying would help
achieve the appropriate balance between democratic participation and
subsidy concerns. One would be to determine a meaningful limit on lobbying expenditures. Section 501(h) takes such an approach, but few organizations make the § 501(h) election. Some organizations fear that
making the election might increase the possibility of audit, although the
Service has said repeatedly that this is not the case. Large organizations
find the $1 million cap restrictive and prefer to rely on the indeterminacy
of the "no substantial part" test. One approach might be to make the
§ 501(h) expenditure test mandatory while permitting large organizations
to exceed the $ imillion cap by some percentage of the amount used for
exempt activities subject to a transfer tax on that excess amount. The
second approach might be to consider a substantially related test for lobbying activities. Some might object that this would constrain logrolling in
legislative lobbying, but a rejoinder is that § 501(c)(3) organizations
should be pressing their information and point of view, not hiring staff to
push a broad political agenda of a particular political party or faction of a
political party unrelated to the organization's exempt purpose.
Election campaign activities are prohibited under current law as inconsistent with the exempt status of § 501(c)(3) organizations. At the same
time, the possibility of offering core supporters the tax benefit of deductible contributions while avoiding the limitations and disclosure requirements of federal election law remains a tantalizing prospect for
incumbents and challengers alike. 44 In this case, the Code already contains a confiscatory excise tax on such activity. Section 4955 was enacted
because Congress understood that § 501(c)(3) organizations were being
used to give contributors a charitable contribution deduction while avoiding the limits and requirements of the FECA. Section 4955 applies to
revenue from any source, not simply revenue from charitable contributions. In cases of collusion, the Service can deny contributions their § 170
deductions. However, many contributors will be innocent victims of diversion for whom penalties are inappropriate. Section 4955 could be
amended to increase the rate of sanctions in the case of the diversion of
charitable contributions revenue.

143. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983). For a discussion of
subsidy theory, see TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 4, at $ 5.02. For a
discussion of the concept of unconstitutional conditions, see Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1989).
144. The controversy surrounding Newt Gingrich's use of § 501(c)(3) organizations to
fund electoral activity made use of these structures too controversial for many politicians.
See supra note 110. Pressures of the new Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act may lead politicians to take another look. They are already forming § 501(c)(4) organizations to avoid
disclosure under the FECA or § 527(i).
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Transfer Taxes on Uses of Program Service Revenues
Program service revenues should be subject to the same transfer taxes
as those applied in the case of charitable contributions. The only rationale for charging a fee for providing the services that provide the basis of
the organization's exemption is to enable the organization to continue to
provide such services. The organization is not diverting financial resources or staff time from its exempt activities, which distinguishes program revenue from revenue earned from commercial activities.
Transfer Taxes on Uses of Private Foundation Grants
Private foundation grants are already subject to substantial limitations
on use imposed as a condition of receipt by a public charity. 145 Private
foundations that give grants used for purposes other than exempt activities are subject to a series of excise taxes, but the recipient organizations
that in fact divert the grant from the promised use for exempt activities
face no sanctions apart from jeopardizing their prospects for funding
from a particular foundation in the future. Consistent with targeting
within the recipient organization, the nondiversion constraint would apply transfer taxes on any use of a foundation grant for purposes other
than exempt purposes. The transfer taxes imposed would mirror those
imposed on revenue from charitable contributions. The accounting
model based on source and use accounts would facilitate monitoring by
the private foundation that made the grant and thereby ease the burden
of compliance with the private foundation's expenditure responsibility. It
would also facilitate monitoring by the board of the public charity
recipient.
Transfer Taxes on Revenue from Commercial Activities
The current treatment of commercial activities ignores the source of
the funding of the commercial activities or the uses of the revenues produced by the commercial activities. Targeting requires that both the
source and uses be considered. Revenue from commercial activities used
for exempt activities might seem a likely case for favorable tax treatment.
This would revive the destination of income test of prior law by applying
it inside the organization. The issue that Congress never directly addressed, and that the Service has avoided, is that of the permissible scope
of commercial activities.
The issue is whether that transfer should be tax-favored on grounds
that it provides funding for exempt activities or whether the use of the
organization's resources (including staff time and other administrative
overhead) for commercial activities, should be discouraged. If the internal transfer is tax-favored, commercial revenue generated inside exempt
organizations and used for exempt activities is treated more favorably
145. Many public charities have grown so dependent on private foundation grants that

they have made loosening those limitations a priority. This is especially marked with respect to legislative lobbying and particularly political activities.
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than commercial revenue generated by taxable entities and contributed
to exempt organizations, presumably for exempt activities. 14 6 There
might be some basis for this difference if the unrelated business income
tax rules taxed all commercial income of an exempt organization, but the
structure of UBIT and its many modifications and exceptions mean that
very little of the commercial income of exempt organizations is taxed.
The result is that any tax incentive for a transfer to commercial activities
is also an incentive for the expansion of commercial activities. The commensurate in scope issue then becomes more acute, not simply as a matter of proportionality but also, and more importantly, as question of
business efficiency and as a question of the relation to exempt activities.
Any commercial revenues reinvested in a commercial enterprise will be
subject to a transfer tax. This transfer tax will make reinvestment, and
thus the operation of commercial enterprises inside exempt organizations, inefficient and thereby enhance the incentive to focus the organization managers' time and attention on exempt activities.
Any commercial revenues used for legislative lobbying should become
subject to § 162(e), which provides that lobbying is not an ordinary and
necessary business expense. In addition, this transfer of commercial revenue to legislative lobbying uses would be subject to a transfer tax.
Any commercial revenues used for political activities should be prohibited based on the prohibition of the use of corporate funds for either
contributions or independent expenditures under the FECA. In this instance, concern with the terms of engagement outside the organization
are as important as concerns with diversion within the organization. The
transfer tax should thus be confiscatory, capped only by the amount of
commercial revenue the organization generated during the taxable year.
Transfer Taxes on Revenue from Government Grants and Contracts
Government contracts or grants are subject to government accounting
requirements that may carry stiffer sanctions than those imposed by a
nondiversion constraint. At the same time, the increasing reliance of exempt organizations on government funding means that targeting for charitable efficiency should encompass government grants as well as the other
sources of funds. Exempt organizations are already subject to recordkeeping requirements with respect to the use of government funds.
Excise Tax on Organization Managers
Organization managers control the internal diversion transfers discussed here. The tax on managers should be based on the total diversion
within the organization during the taxable year. Sections 4955 and 4958
both contain manager-level taxes that could serve as the templates for the
manager-level tax anticipated here. The purpose of taxing managers is to
provide an incentive to avoid the internal diversion that define charitable
146. The § 170 charitable contribution deduction is limited, and the limit is lower in the
case of corporate contributors than in the case of individual contributors.
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inefficiency. Taxing managers also provides an element of accountability
that is not available under current law.
VI. TARGETING, CHARITABLE EFFICIENCY
AND COMPLEXITY
Targeting tax exemption through the nondiversion constraint proposed
here raises issues of appropriate levels of complexity in tax reform. The
complexity of the nondiversion constraint is appropriate to the complexity of the operations of the various organizations subject to it. Small organizations that receive § 170 contributions and engage solely in exempt
activities will have one source account and one use account. Organizations that receive revenue from multiple sources and direct these revenue
to multiple types of activities will need to trace amounts only to those
activities in which they have chosen to engage. The amount of the transfer tax on the organization and on the organization managers will be proportional to the diversions that the organization managers have
authorized.
The nondiversion constraint is less complex than the alternatives available in this era of convergence. One approach is to do nothing and
thereby accept continued diversions. The alternative is to develop a
workable commensurate in scope concept to limit the permissible level of
diversion. Opting for the nondiversion constraint suggested here makes
the problem of crafting a commensurate in scope concept less pressing
and eases the problems of characterization discussed here.
The nondiversion constraint offers the additional benefit of providing
the basis for operational transparency. In so doing, it establishes a workable framework for meaningful participation and accountability within
exempt organizations.
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